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I. INTRODUCTION
INCE people have had the privilege of naming the recipients of
their bounty upon death, property owners have endeavored to en-
capsulate their property disposition desires in wills shielded from
attack by dissatisfied heirs. Similarly, as the practice of transferring prop-
erty via trusts gains in popularity, people are motivated to shelter trusts
from costly challenges as well. One of the oldest of these protective tech-
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niques is the in terrorem clause,' that is, a provision that voids gifts to
beneficiaries who fail in their attempt to invalidate the instrument and
seek to enlarge their shares by taking as heirs under the applicable intes-
tacy statutes or under a prior dispositive instrument.
Under a typical in terrorem provision, the beneficiary is presented with
a choice of either (1) accepting the gift under the will or trust, or (2)
contesting the instrument with the hope of upsetting the testator's or set-
tlor's intended disposition and, instead, receiving a greater share of prop-
erty through intestacy, under a prior will, or via some other means, but
with the concomitant risk of triggering a forfeiture of all benefits if the
contest fails.2 If the contestant successfully obstructs the probate of the
testator's will or invalidates the trust, the in terrorem provision is disre-
garded because the entire instrument to which it is an integral part is
nullified.3 Conversely, if the contesting beneficiary fails to prove that the
will or trust is invalid, the in terrorem provision is applied, and the con-
testing beneficiary will no longer be entitled to the gift.4 In the majority
1. In this Article, "no-contest" provisions are referred to as "in terrorem" clauses.
However, this may be a misnomer, because historically, the party breaching the no-contest
clause would pray to the court to find the clause to be "in terrorem only" or "merely in
terrorem." See Cooke v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727, 732, 153 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1846)
(citing Cage v. Russel, 2 Ventr. 352, as the first case to hold that if an in terrorem clause
provides that upon a breach the legacy is given over to the executor and not a stranger then
the clause is treated as in terrorem merely, and not obligatory); Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Atk.
398, 404 (1737) (treating condition as in terrorem only if the clause does not provide for a
gift over to a third party). The effect of such a finding by the court was that the clause
would be considered a "threat only," and if breached, it would not cause a forfeiture. The
early English cases followed this approach with bequests of personal property when the
testator failed to provide a gift over, that is, to name an alternative beneficiary to take the
bequest forfeited by the breaching party. Since the rejection of the English rule, however,
which accorded a different treatment to devises of realty as opposed to bequests of person-
alty, the "in terrorem only" defense has vanished and the courts and scholars have used the
terms "in terrorem" and "no-contest" interchangeably.
2. See Kitchen v. Ballard, 220 P. 301, 303 (Cal. 1923) (equating choice by beneficiary
under in terrorem provision to that of ordinary decision arising from business transactions:
"whether the thing offered is worth the price demanded"); Schiffer v. Brenton, 226 N.W.
253, 254-55 (Mich. 1929) (emphasizing choice by beneficiary to take devise under will or
contest will and possibly lose and forfeit devise); In re Estate of Seymour, 600 P.2d 274, 276
(N.M. 1979) (noting that whenever a beneficiary challenges a will that includes an in ter-
rorem provision the beneficiary does so while putting the testamentary gift in jeopardy);
see also Jack Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testa-
ments, 15 HAST. L.J. 45, 45 (1963) (discussing all or nothing gamble by beneficiary who
contests will).
3. See THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 82, at 408 (2d ed.
1953) (commenting that in terrorem provision fails with entire instrument if contestant suc-
cessfully challenges will); WILLIAM M. McGovERr,, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND Es-
TATES § 14.1, at 586 (1988) (noting that if will is found to be invalid upon contest, forfeiture
provision fails with rest of will); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 9.1
(1983) (application results in beneficiary's interest passing as if in terrorem provision never
existed if it is deemed ineffective). See generally Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of
Provision of Will or Trust Instrument for Forfeiture or Reduction of Share of Contesting
Beneficiary, 23 A.L.R.4th 369, 373 (1983) [hereinafter Validity and Enforceability] (identi-
fying the most common grounds for contesting a will to be lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, fraud, forgery, improper execution, or revocation by subsequent will).
4. See In re Estate of Hartz, 77 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1956) (acknowledging that
contestant who is unsuccessful in proving will invalid invokes forfeiture clause); Rossi v.
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of jurisdictions throughout the United States, conditions prescribing for-
feiture upon contest of an instrument by a beneficiary have been gener-
ally held valid, enforceable, and not against public policy.5
Although Texas courts have established the validity of in terrorem
clauses in wills, the case law does not delineate the true extent of their
enforceability. The first two cases, decided by separate Texas Courts of
Appeals, strictly enforced in terrorem clauses. 6 Subsequent decisions,
however, suggest that the forfeiture may not occur if the beneficiary
brought the contest with probable cause and in good faith.7 The Texas
Supreme Court has yet to settle this issue. The inconsistent case law, cou-
pled with the lack of any statutory authority, renders the effectiveness of
utilizing an in terrorem clause unpredictable in Texas.
In Texas, as in most states, there is virtually no statutory law and very
little case law addressing in terrorem clauses in inter vivos trusts. 8 Where
a will pours over into an established trust, at least one court has refused
to apply the in terrorem clause in the will to a contest directed at the
Davis, 133 S.W.2d 363, 372 (Mo. 1939) (noting that beneficiary has the choice to contest
will and that if the contest fails, forfeiture of the devise occurs); Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278
(asserting that when a beneficiary contests will in face of an in terrorem clause, the benefi-
ciary does so at peril of the bequest); Elder v. Elder, 120 A.2d 815, 819 (R.I. 1956) (stating
that after devisee has unsuccessfully contested will forfeiture is mandatory). See generally
ATKINSON, supra note 3, § 82, at 408-09 (identifying general rule that failure of contest
invokes forfeiture under in terrorem provision).
5. See Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1898) (reviewing authorities
and holding in terrorem provisions valid and consistent with good law and morals); Lytle v.
Zebold, 357 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Ark. 1962) (upholding validity of forfeiture provisions because
testator can choose to devise property to any beneficiary or refuse to devise to any benefi-
ciary who attempts to thwart testator's intent); Womble v. Gunter, 95 S.E.2d 213, 216-18
(Va. 1956) (surveying authorities and holding in terrorem provisions consistent with public
policy considerations of discouraging litigation, saving estate assets, and maintaining testa-
tor's intended distribution). See generally 5 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER,
PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.29, at 469-72 (1962) (discussing authority on legality of
prohibiting will contests); Validity and Enforceability, supra note 3, at 374 (identifying au-
thority supporting the general rule that forfeiture provisions that eliminate bequest of con-
testing beneficiary are valid).
6. See Massie v. Massie, 118 S.W. 219, 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ); Perry v.
Rogers, 114 S.W. 897, 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ).
7. See Hammer v. Powers, 819 S.W.2d 669, 673 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no
writ) (stating that "[a] forfeiture of rights under the terms of a will will not be enforced
where the contest of the will was made in good faith and upon probable cause"); Gunter v.
Pogue, 672 S.W.2d, 840, 843-44 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (survey-
ing Texas case law concerning probable cause exception); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275,
287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1955)
(discussing probable cause exception to forfeiture and quoting Calvery and First Methodist
decisions); First Methodist Episcopal Church South v. Anderson, 110 S.W.2d 1177, 1184
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ dism'd) (citing Calvery and asserting that "the great
weight of authorities sustain the rule" that forfeiture will be denied when contest is
brought under probable cause); see also W. Harry Jack, No-Contest or In Terrorem Clauses
in Wills-Construction and Enforcement, 19 Sw. L.J. 722, 729-31 (1965) (surveying Texas
case law acknowledgement of probable cause exception).
8. See Jo Ann Engelhardt, In Terrorem Inter Vivos: Terra Incognita, 26 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 535, 542 (1991) (citing CALIF. PROB. CODE ANN. § 21300 (West 1991),




trust.9 Consequently, the settlor or testator who wants to avoid contests
should include an in terrorem clause in both instruments. 10 The reasons
prompting a testator to include an in terrorem clause in a will apply
equally to inter vivos trusts." Further, both trusts and wills can be con-
tested on grounds of undue influence and fraud. Although inter vivos
trusts require far fewer formalities than a will and, subsequently, are less
likely to be successfully attacked on such grounds, in some states the re-
quired capacity to execute an inter vivos trust is higher than that required
for a will.12 Therefore, a beneficiary of a trust may have a better chance
of prevailing in a trust contest for lack of capacity as compared to a will
contestant.13
Due to the great importance the law places on freedom of testation and
the ability of people to dispose of their property as they see fit while
alive, the courts should uphold the wishes of the donor, be it a testator or
a settlor. In terrorem clauses represent one method of fulfilling a donor's
clearly expressed intentions.14 Because the great majority of will and
trust contests are futile and result in the wasting of the donor's property,
the courts should uphold in terrorem clauses to discourage needless, vexa-
tious, and costly litigation.' 5 Further, the courts recognize that "often,
after the death of a testator, . . . contests are commenced wherein not
infrequently are brought to light matters of private life that ought never
to be made public, and in respect to which the voice of the testator cannot
be heard either in explanation or denial."'1 6 Therefore, the courts also
uphold in terrorem clauses to protect the privacy of the donor and pre-
vent the public airing of the donor's private matters and family secrets.' 7
Finally, in terrorem clauses may reduce the family animosity that often
results from contests over the donor's capacity.' 8
9. See In re Lindstrom, 236 Cal. Rptr. 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (construing in ter-
rorem clause in pour over will as not applying to contest of the trust).
10. See 23 PHILLIP E. HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING I 603.1(C)(2)
(1989).
11. See Engelhardt, supra note 8, at 542 (noting the reasons to use an in terrorem
clause in a trust include "to protect the grantor's wishes, to avoid litigation, or to place an
absolute limit on a beneficiary's interest in assets").
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Martin D. Begleiter, Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the
Final Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 631 (1994). See, e.g., Meech, 169 U.S. at 415; Burtman
v. Burtman, 85 A.2d 892, 895 (N.H. 1952); Alper v. Alper, 65 A.2d 737, 741 (N.J. 1949);
Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 81 (Wyo. 1983).
15. See, e.g., South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 101 A. 961, 963 (Conn. 1917) (noting
policy argument that in terrorem provisions prevent waste of estate assets through deter-
ring long, drawn-out litigation and hindering exposure of family secrets); Barry v. Ameri-
can Sec. & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1943); see also Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala.
501, 504 (1881); Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278; Begleiter, supra note 14, at 631.
16. Meech, 169 U.S. at 415.
17. See id.; Begleiter, supra note 14, at 631.
18. See Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278 (discussing policy behind probable cause exception
to protect estates from costly litigation and lessen chance of family animosities over testa-
tor's capacity and bequests).
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Part I of this Article discusses the history and development of the in
terrorem provision by presenting examples of precedent and actual in ter-
rorem provisions utilized in ancient times, in England prior to the Nor-
man Conquest, in early common law preceding the Statute of Wills, in
modern common law, and in the earliest decisions of United States
courts. Part II examines the four approaches courts and legislatures in
the United States currently follow in evaluating in terrorem provisions.
Part III focuses on the use and judicial treatment of in terrorem provi-
sions in Texas, examines the validity of in terrorem provisions in the state,
and exposes the uncertainty resulting from the reported opinions. Fi-
nally, Part IV addresses the need for legislative enactment of a compre-
hensive in terrorem statute in Texas and concludes with a proposed
statute designed to provide predictability to the law of in terrorem
provisions.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IN
TERROREM CLAUSE
A. ANCIENT HISTORY
1. Biblical Account of Creation
The Biblical account of creation documents the earliest use of threats
to control behavior. After God created heaven, earth, and the living
creatures, God planted the Garden of Eden. God then placed Adam in
charge of Eden subject to the following in terrorem provision: "And the
Lord God commanded the man thus, 'From every tree of the garden you
may eat; but from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you must
not eat; for the day you eat of it, you must die."' 19
Despite the severity of the potential penalty, Adam nonetheless ate the
forbidden fruit. 20 God, acting as judge and jury, refused to enforce the in
terrorem clause to the promised extent.21 Instead, God imposed a less
severe penalty, that is, banishment from Eden.22 On Eve, who instigated
the breach, God assessed the additional punishment of painful child-
birth.23 Thus, the stage was set for the debate that still rages today, i.e., to
what extent should the sanction provided in an in terrorem clause actually
be imposed and what mitigating factors may the court properly consider?
2. Babylonian Civilization
Over 4000 years ago, the people of Babylon included in terrorem provi-
sions in marriage contracts to prevent alterations and to frighten the par-
ties, as well as others, into adhering to the agreements. The following two
examples were inscribed approximately 2200 B.C.
19. Genesis 2:16-17.
20. See id. at 3:6.
21. See id. at 3:23-24.
22. See id. at 3:24.
23. See id. at 3:16.
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Ahhu-ayabi is daughter of Innabatum. Innabatum, her mother,
has given her in marriage to Zukania. Should Zukania forsake her,
he shall pay one mana of silver. Should Ahhu-ayabi deny him, he
may throw her down from the tower. As long as Innabatum lives,
Ahhu-ayabi shall support her, and Innabatum afterwards [shall have
nothing] 24 against Ahhu-ayabi, ... [They have invoked the spirit of
the Sun-god and Zabium (the king)]. Whoever changes the words of
[th]is [tablet] [shall pay the penalty].25
Iltani is sister of Taram-Sagila. Arad-Samas, son of Ili-ennam, has
taken them in marriage from Uttatum, their father ... [If Iltani say
to Arad-Samas, her husband], "Thou [art not my husband]," he may
shave [her head], and sell her for silver. And [if] Arad-Samas say to
his wives, "[Ye] are not my wives," he shall pay one mana of silver.
And they, [if] they say to Arad-Samas, their husband, "Thou art not
our husband," he may strangle them, and throw them into the
river.2 6
Perhaps the earliest record of a testamentary in terrorem provision is
found in the will of a Mesopotamian man written in the thirteenth cen-
tury B.C.
And now therefore, my two sons-Yatlinu, the elder, and Yanhamu,
the younger-whichever of them shall bring a lawsuit against
Bidawe, or shall abuse Bidawe, their mother, shall pay 500 shekels of
silver to the king; he shall set his cloak upon the doorbolt, and shall
depart into the street. But whichever of them shall have paid respect
to Bidawe, his mother-to that one will she bequeath (the
possessions). 27
As these examples illustrate, people have used in terrorem clauses since
the earliest recorded history to control the conduct of others. Often the
clauses would threaten physical violence, monetary penalties, or banish-
ment from the household. As the next section explains, after the birth of
Christ, the drafters of in terrorem clauses focused on society's biggest ap-
prehension at the time, the fear of God and eternal damnation.
B. ENGLAND PRIOR TO THE NORMAN CONQUEST
In England, Anglo-Saxon testators drafted in terrorem clauses focusing
on the survivors' fear of facing God in the after life to prevent others
from altering their wills. One historian wrote that the will of Birthric and
his wife Elswith, written sometime around 950 A.D., was "the oldest tes-
24. The quoted clauses are reproduced without any modification to their form as pub-
lished. Assyriology, the study of the literature and antiquities of the Babylonians and As-
syrians, is a science still in development and, therefore, the author of the published text,
from which we have taken these clauses, was required to rephrase certain obscure inscrip-
tions. The changes are delineated by the words in brackets. Throughout this Article, only
parentheticals that appeared in the original text will be found within quotation marks.
25. THEOPHILUS G. PINCHES, THE OLD TESTAMENT IN LIGHT OF THE HISTORICAL
RECORDS AND LEGENDS OF ASSYRIA AND BABYLONIA 174 (2d ed. 1903).
26. Id. at 175.
27. II THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST: A NEW ANTHOLOGY OF TEXT AND PICTURES 80
(James B. Pritchard ed., 1975).
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tament he had seen made in England. '28 The will contained the follow-
ing in terrorem language.
And I pray my dear lord, for the love of God, that he will not
allow any man to alter our will. And I pray all God's friends that
they will give their support to it. May he who violates it have to
account with God, and may God be ever gracious to him who wishes
to uphold it.29
The following in terrorem clauses were included in wills drafted over
the next century. Because none of the documents contained dates, his-
torians can only estimate the dates of origination through references and
titles used within the instruments.
And I beseech whoever may then be king, for the love of God and
all his saints, that let my children do what they may, they may never
set aside the will which I have declared for my soul's sake. And if
anyone alter it, may he have to account for it with God and the holy
saints to whom I have bequeathed my property, so that he who shall
alter this will may never repent it except in the torment of hell, un-
less I myself alter it before my death.30
Then I pray you, my dear friend AElfheah, that [you] will watch
both over the estate and those who are my kinsmen, and that you
will never permit anyone to alter this in any way. If anyone do so,
may God destroy him both soul and body, both here and in the fu-
ture, unless I myself change it.31
If anyone ever alters or removes anything in this will may God's
grace and his eternal reward be taken from him for ever; and may he
never be found in his favour, but be excommunicated from the soci-
ety of all Christ's chosen companies, both now and in eternity, unless
he will quickly desist from that and also make full restitution. 32
And whatsoever man shall alter this bequest, may he be a compan-
ion in the torment of hell of Judas who betrayed our Lord.33
He who alters this-may God expel him from the kingdom of
heaven to the torments of hell, unless he repent it all the more
deeply before his last day.34
And I pray my lady, for God's sake, that you will [not] permit
anyone to alter my will. And he who alters it-unless it be myself-
may God Almighty turn his face from him on the Day of Judgment.
28. JOHN SELDEN, OF THE ORIGINAL OF ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTIONS OF TESTA-
MENTs 5 (1683).
29. DOROTHY WHITEaLOCK, ANGLO-SAXON WILLS 29 (Harold Dexter Hazeltine ed.,
1930).
30. Id. at 9, note at 104 (estimating date of origination to be between 946 and 951 and
further noting that other scholars had dated will to have been drafted "about 958").
31. Id. at 16-17, note at 114 (determining that the document was drafted between 955
and 958) (alteration in the original).
32. Id. at 34-35, note at 133 (explaining the will was drafted sometime "[a]fter 975 and
certainly before 1016").
33. Id. at 66-67, note at 175 (stating that the will was probably drafted between 1004
and 1014, but noting the will contained "an impossible list of witnesses").




May God keep you. 35
He who wishes to alter this will, unless it be I myself, may God
destroy him now and on the Day of Judgment. Amen. 36
And he who shall detract from my will which I have now declared
in the witness of God, may he be deprived of joy on this earth, and
may the Almighty Lord who created and made all creatures exclude
him from the fellowship of all saints on the Day of Judgment, and
may he be delivered into the abyss of hell to Satan the devil and all
his accursed companions and there suffer with God's adversaries,
without end, and never trouble my heirs. 37
C. EARLY COMMON LAW-NORMAN CONQUEST TO THE WILLS Acr
OF 1540
After the Norman invasion and subsequent establishment of the feudal
system, the power to dispose of land by will rapidly disappeared, except
in several boroughs where the crown tolerated a contrary custom. 38 To
avoid this restriction, buyers of land conveyed the acquired property to
trustees, called feoffees, and prayed in their wills that the feoffees would
follow the terms of the will by either entailing the land to the testator's
sons or conveying the realty to whomever bought it from the executors.39
The following provisions are illustrative of the type of language used in
these wills.
I pray yow also pat ben my Feffees, pat ze make estate vn-to my
forseyd chyldre, lucie, henre and william, lyke as my wylle ys be-fore
conteynyd.40
And also I praye, and in goddisbyhalf require, pat alle pe feffes pat
ben enfeffyd in my londes, pat in what tyme pat pay ben duly re-
quired by myn Executours to make a-state to any person, pat pay
perfourme hit in discharge of my soule, as pey woll onswere a-fore
god. Also I pray my feffours pat pay wold suffer myn Executours to
selle Stanlehalle, and to enfeffe what man pay euer myn Executours
require hem to.41
The changes to the law brought about by the Norman Conquest did
not, however, effect the ability to dispose of personal property via testa-
ments which were under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.42
Testators frequently left the bulk of their estate to priests, monks, and
35. Id. at 78-79, note at 187 (stating the will was drafted "[d]uring the episcopate of
Elfweard of London, i.e., 1035 to 1044") (alteration in the original).
36. Id. at 83, note at 192 (reasoning that the will could not have been written later than
1045 with the earliest possible date being 1043).
37. Id. at 87, note at 197 (relying on the Latin heading in the register, which dated this
will to 1046).
38. See 26 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1322 (2d ed. 1951); WALTER T. DUN-
MORE, GARDNER ON WILLS 6 (2d ed. 1916); 1 WILLIAM H. PAGE, PAGE ON WILLS § 15 (3d
ed. 1941).
39. See FREDERICK J. FURNIVALL, THE FivrY EARLIEST ENGLISH WILLS IN THE
COURT OF PROBATE, LONDON Xiii (Frederick J. Furnivall ed., 1964) (1882).
40. Id. at 20 (taken from the will of Sir W.M. Langeford dated 1411).
41. Id. at 72 (clause was contained in the 1426 will of W.M. Hanyngfeld).
42. See PAGE, supra note 38, at § 23.
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fryers, even if it meant leaving their heirs penniless, and requested nu-
merous masses to be held or prayers to be said for their souls, often for
many years following their demise. 43
Although this practice largely eliminated the need for in terrorem
clauses because the heirs would have nothing to lose by disputing the
instruments, a few examples have been preserved. The following in ter-
rorem clauses are contained in wills which were exhibited to the former
Officers of the Archbishop of Canterbury between 1395 and 1439, and
are presently stored in the department for Literary Enquiry, in the Regis-
try of the Court of Probate, Somerset House, London.
Also my wille ys, pat yf my wyfe or my chyldre askun here resn-
able part of my godes aftur cours of lawe, pan wille y pat pey be
excludyd of alle pe avauntage of pe ordinauns of my wylle above y-
seyd... and y pray alle zow pat bene enfeffed in my londes forseyd
by me, pay ze fulfylle my forseyd wylie os ze wylie answere a-fore
god.4
4
Also he will that if his wyf or eny of his saide sonnes worke the
contrarye of this his present wille, in lettyng or distourbyng the saide
executours of fulfillyng ther-of, that than pey shall lose aduantage
and benefite of thes his present will.45
And all-so that she clayme no dower nor Ioyntfeffement, nor no
thyng do, ne wirke (that might greue his heires or his executours) In
no maner degree contrarie his will, nor that she claime no lointestate
in none other of his londes ne rentez of his purchace, nor in no
londes ne tenementez of his purchace, nor in no londes, tenementes
nor annuities wich he hath graunted to eny of his seruauntez for
terme of lyf or othir wyse. And if she doo the contrarie to eny thyng
of this his last will, or make eny clayme yn the contrarie ther-of,
Than that she haue oonly but hir dowere of all his maners landes and
43. See FURNIVALL, supra note 39, at xii
[T]he most surprizing and regrettable thing in these Wills is the amount of
money to hav[e] been wasted in vain prayers, or orders for them .... [O]ne
man ordered[ed] a [m]illion [mlasses to be said for his soul; another 10,000;
another 4,400; another sending Pilgrims to Spain, Rome, Jerusalem, &c. for
the good of his soul! I only hope some sensible Executors handed over the
money to the Testators' wives and children, or the poor.
The Papists also holde it to be a work of [u]nspeakable merit, for a man or
woman, eyther before they dye, or else at their death, to gi[v]e the greatest
part of their goods & lands (the more, the more merite) to popish priestes,
(though in the meane time, theyr wife, children, and wholde familyes goe a
begging all theyr lyfe long,) to Monkes, and Fryers, with the rest of that
filthie generation, to the ende they may pray for them when they are dead, to
saie masses, trentalls, direges, de prafundis, Ladies psalters, and I can not tell
what riffe raffe else for them: bearing them in hand, that their souls & the
soules of al their friends, parents, dindred, and aliance, shall not onely bee
releeued, but also cleerely delyuered thereby out of the pains of purgatorie,
which otherwise shoulde lye there broiling in firie flames seauen yeeres for
euerie sinne that euer they committed in this life, either in thoght, word, or
deed. Which if it were true, (as it is most false and blasphemous) I could not
blame men, though they ga[v]e all they had, and more too, to the Priests.
Id. (citing PHILLIP STUBBES, MOTIVE TO GOOD WORKES 120-22 (1593)).
44. Id. at 20-21 (found in will of Sir W.M. Langeford dated 1411).
45. Id. at 128 (quoting from the will of Sir Ralph Rochefort dated 1439).
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tenementes of his enheritaunce forsaid.4 6
As the following examples illustrate, testators also utilized in terrorem
clauses to persuade the beneficiaries to do or refrain from doing some
act.
[I]f it so be that Thomas my sone forseyd, and lohane his wif,
wolle noght take the charge to be myne executors, and to parfourne
the administracion of this testamentt, which is [my] laste wil, as it is
wrete her'-before, thanne .1. wole that alle the godis which that .1.
haue deuysed to the forseyd Thomas my sone and lohane his wif in
this testament, be solde by myn executours which wol take the
charge herof, and trewly ydo to charitable werkes for my lordes
soule, Sir Thomas West, and for myn, and for al cristene soules. 47
Item I bequethe to the same Ionet my wyf my maner of Staverton
with the appurtenaunces, in the shire of Gloucestre, to haue & to
holde, terme of here lyfe, . . .Vp condicioun that the same Ionet
suffre Emot, here moder, to reioise peisibly, & to haue & to holde,
terme of the lyf of the same Emot, the Maner of Aspleye with the
appurtenaunces; And al-so vp condicioun that same Ionet saue and
kepe harmeles myn heirs & executours ... And zif so be that [the]
forsaide Jonet my wyf put oute the forsaide Emet here modir, in here
lyf of the forsait Manere of Aspleye with the appurtenaunces, & pat
may be recorded be Trewe men, than y wille that the same Ionet be
vtterliche excluded & voyded fro the forsaide Manere of Staverton
with the appurtenaunces, & pat she haue no profet per-of, terme of
here lyf.48
Testators, remembering the common saying of the time that "Three Ex-
ecutors make three Thieves," 49 typically included a warning in their wills,
reminding their executors that God will question them about any forbid-
den actions they take with the testator's property.50
And I require hem all, and eueryche of hem, that they do trwly
and feithfully theyre part and dever to execute and parforme this my
last will, as they all and euerych of hem woll Answere a-fore god at
the day of dome.51
D. MODERN COMMON LAW PERIOD-POST STATUTE OF WILLS
The English Parliament restored to landowners the ability to devise
realty through a will with the enactment of the Statute of Wills in 1540.52
Influenced by the "enlightened" thinking of the Renaissance, testators
began to realize that their heirs were more concerned with the present
than with any potential after life, be it a reward or a punishment. Thus,
46. Id. at 122 (included in Sir Ralph Rochefort's 1439 will).
47. Id. at 9 (quoting from the will codicil of Lady Alice West dated "a thousand and
thre hundred and foure score and fiftene," or 1395).
48. Id. at 33-34 (taken from the 1418 will of John Chelmyswyk).
49. See id. at xiv.
50. See id. at 15, 17, 21, 27, 29, 42, 51, 54, 58, 66, 80, 87, 89, 97, 102, 112, 119.
51. Id. at 119 (warning taken from the will of the Countess of Warwick dated 1439).
52. See 32 Hen. VIII, ch. 1 (1540).
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as society became more materialistic, in terrorern clauses shifted from ap-
pealing to the beneficiary's intangible fear of future unending suffering to
immediate threats of losing a valuable devise or bequest.
The earliest reported case involving a forfeiture provision drafted after
the Statute of Wills was decided in 1674.53 In that Anonymous case, a
testator devised certain lands to A,54 his heir at law, and another piece of
property to B in fee.55 He included the following provision in his will, "If
A. molest B. by suit or otherwise, he shall lose what is devised to him, and
it shall go to B."'56 After the testator's death, A entered into and claimed
the land of B. The Court of Common Pleas held that this entry and claim
was a sufficient breach to entitle B to the land of A. 57
In 1688, the High Court of Chancery examined the enforceability of in
terrorem provisions. 58 In Powell v. Morgan, the testatrix left a will devis-
ing her land and giving her heir at law, who brought the suit, a legacy
upon condition that he refrain from disturbing or interrupting her will.
The heir brought suit challenging the validity of the will. The High Court
of Chancery, without any explanation, held, "[tlhere was probabilis causa
litigandi," and consequently no forfeiture of the legacy.59 Thus, fourteen
years after the Court of Common Pleas upheld the enforceability of in
terrorem provisions, the High Court of Chancery developed the first rudi-
mentary good faith, probable cause exception to its application. 60
Shortly thereafter, the High Court of Chancery considered the applica-
tion of in terrorem clauses to trusts.61 In Webb v. Webb, decided in 1710,
an English court ruled that a provision in a will giving a beneficiary forty
pounds on condition that he did not disturb the trustees was valid and
enforceable. The High Court of Chancery held, again without any discus-
sion of its reasoning, that if the trustee were about to have an execution
of the trust, the son would forfeit his legacy if he failed to join in the
sale.62
53. See Anonymous, 2 Mod. 7, 7, 86 Eng. Rep. 910, 910 (1674) (holding forfeiture
provision valid under express terms provided by will); see also Leavitt, supra note 2, at 47
(discussing historical setting of in terrorem provision and identifying important early cases).
54. Many of the earlier reported English cases were styled "Anonymous." In these
cases, the reporter would refer to the parties as A, B, C, etc. to retain the parties'
anonymity.
55. Anonymous, 86 Eng. Rep. at 910.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90, 23 Eng. Rep. 668 (Ch. 1688) (hailed by some
authors as the first reported case of the no-contest provision, but its precedential use was
limited because of the lack of discussion about the in terrorem provision); Olin L.
Brownder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-Examined, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
320, 320 n.1 (1949); Leavitt, supra note 2, at 48 n.12 (noting Powell decision was first case in
which court set out entire decision with regard to contested in terrorem provision).
59. Powell, 23 Eng. Reg. at 668.
60. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 59; Dawn Koren, No-Contest Clauses: Settlement Of-
fers from the Grave, 12 PROB. L.J. 173, 176 (1995).
61. See Webb v. Webb, 1 P.W.M.S. 132, 24 Eng. Rep. 325 (1710). See also Leavitt,
supra note 2, at 48.
62. See Webb, 24 Eng. Rep. at 327; Leavitt, supra note 2, at 48.
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In the 1734 case of Loyd v. Spillet, however, the Lord Chancellor re-
fused to enforce an in terrorem clause because to do so would have pro-
tected a trustee who had breached his fiduciary duties. 63 The testator had
made a will devising all his real and personal property to the defendant
and another trustee (since dead), in trust to pay £15 per year to the plain-
tiffs, his sisters. After several legacies, the testator devised the surplus in
trust with instructions to make specific annual payments to certain minis-
ters.64 The testator also gave £300 to both trustees and £20 per year to
compensate them for administering the trust. 65 The will contained an in
terrorem clause that revoked the sisters' annuities if they disputed the
will.66 Afterwards, the testator transferred his real and personal estates,
by separate deeds dated after his will, to the trustees with a proviso stat-
ing the deeds would be void on the tender of tens. The trustees, after
making regular annual payments to the beneficiaries for some time, sud-
denly refused to pay the sisters or the ministers and continued to collect
the rents and income from the trust property for their own use.67 The
sisters brought this suit against the one surviving trustee claiming the two
deeds being subsequent to the will acted as a revocation of the will. Fur-
ther, they argued that because the transfers were voluntary, without con-
sideration, and made to the defendant as trustee, a resulting trust should
arise for the sisters who were the heirs at law.68 The trustee in his answer
claimed the will was valid and asked the court to determine if the sisters
had forfeited their annuities by prosecuting the suit.69 The Lord Chancel-
lor declared that "he very much disliked the defense that had been made
in controverting the payment of these small annuities . . ., and insisting
that they had been forfeited by this their bill."'70 The Lord Chancellor
ordered the trustee to resume paying the trust beneficiaries their annual
payments along with all payments in arrears. He also ordered the trustee
to pay the sisters' costs incurred in bringing the suit and denied the
trustee's prayer to take the costs from the estate, stating "the trustee had
made so ill a defense, as not to have deserved the least favour by this
decree. "71
Cooke v. Turner,72 decided in 1846 by the English High Court of Chan-
cery, is the most notable early decision declaring a forfeiture based upon
a beneficiary's post-testamentary conduct. 73 In Cooke, Sir Gregory Page
63. See Loyd v. Spillet, 3 P.W. 344, 346, 24 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1734); Leavitt, supra note
2, at 48.





69. See id. at 1095.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 15 M. & W. 727, 153 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1846).
73. See id. at 1046-47. See, e.g., Meech, 169 U.S. at 413 (citing to Cooke case as author-
ity on general validity of in terrorem provisions); Rudd v. Searls, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass.
1928) (summarizing English law founded upon Cooke, which held that although contest
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Turner, the testator, was declared a lunatic by a commission of lunacy in
1823 and subsequently by a jury in 1826.7 4 In 1841, he made a will, which
was never revoked or modified before his death in 1843.75 In his will, Sir
Gregory devised a considerable legacy to his daughter, who was his only
child and heiress at law, on condition that if she, or any of her representa-
tives, shall ever
dispute this my will, or my competency to make the same, or if [she]
... shall refuse to confirm this my will,... shall lodge any caveat
against proving the same .... shall refuse or neglect to withdraw or
cause to be withdrawn such caveat, fourteen days after request made
by my executors ... or if any proceedings ... be ... taken by any
person . ., by any possible result of which any estate or interest
could be in any way attainable by my said daughter, . . . of larger
extent or value than is intended for her by this my will, and any such
proceeding shall not be formally disavowed, stayed or resisted by my
said daughter.. ., then I revoke the use and disposition hereinbefore
contained, for the raising and payment, during the life of my said
daughter,... of the aforesaid yearly sum of £2000 .... of the rents
and issues and profits of my estate hereby devised, and also the lib-
erty of residing in my said mansion-house, and all other benefits
hereinbefore given to or in trust for my said daughter, or derivable
by her under this my will, and in lieu thereof I devise .... the yearly
sum of £300 only .... 76
After Sir Gregory died, his daughter disputed the will, his competency
to dispose of his property, and refused to take any action to confirm the
will.77 The Barons of Exchequer found the daughter brought herself both
within the "letter and spirit" of the proviso, "by which her interest is
made to determine" and, therefore, her gift was "clearly forfeited, unless
the proviso itself is void."'78 The daughter argued that enforcement of the
proviso was "against the liberty of the law" and was therefore void.79 She
based her argument on the fact that the Statute of Wills declared "wills
made by persons of non-sane memory" to "not be good or effectual in the
law" and, thus, it was "contrary to the policy of that law" to prevent an
heir at law from "having the fact of the testator's sanity ascertained. '80
The court responded:
made upon probable cause, bequest was forfeited); Schiffer, 226 N.W. at 254 (addressing
historical significance of Cooke and following its precedent); see also Edwin C. Goddard,
Forfeiture Conditions in Wills as Penalty for Contesting Probate, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 273
(1933) (acknowledging Cooke v. Turner as leading English case and detailing history of
forfeiture provision); Robert E. Kuelthau, Note, Wills: Validity of No-Contest Clauses in
Wills, 43 MARO. L. REV. 528, 529 (1960) (examining policy arguments for forfeiture of
bequests in adherence to in terrorem provisions under Cooke).




78. Id. at 1046.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1045.
[Vol. 51
IN TERROREM CLAUSES
There is no duty on the part of an heir, whether of perfect or imper-
fect obligation, to contest his ancestor's sanity. It matters not to the
state whether the land is enjoyed by the heir or the devisee; and we
conceive, therefore, that the law leaves the parties to make just what
contracts and what arrangements they may think expedient, as to the
raising or not raising questions of law or fact among one another, the
sole result of which is to give the enjoyment of property to one
claimant rather than another.81
This was not the final ruling, however, on Sir Gregory's in terrorem
provision. One year later, in Cooke v. Turner 11,82 the Vice-Chancellor,
who had to decide whether to probate the will, decided to allow the ap-
pointed trustee of the unborn issue to bring a suit to determine the valid-
ity of the will or, more specifically, the sanity of the testator. The Vice-
Chancellor was concerned with the fact that Sir Gregory had remained
the subject of a lunacy commission up to his dying day, while the Solici-
tor, who was charged with caring for him, assisted and witnessed the
drafting of his will. Further, the Solicitor, who testified to Sir Gregory's
sanity at the first trial, never informed the commission of his alleged re-
covery. The Vice-Chancellor, who may have been concerned with the
specific restriction on challenging Sir Gregory's competency, wrote "my
opinion is that that very clause, emanating as it did from the testator him-
self, tends to sh[o]w that he was conscious that he was not in that state of
mind in which the law requires a man to be when he executes a will."' 83
The Vice-Chancellor chose to relieve the daughter, who refused to take
part in the proceeding due to the earlier construction of the in terrorem
clause, from application of the forfeiture. The court, once again, seemed
to be attempting to engraft a good faith, probable cause exception onto
the in terrorem doctrine. 84
In determining the application of in terrorem provisions, the English
courts followed common law rules with respect to devises of realty, and
the rules established by the ecclesiastical courts with regards to bequests
of personalty.8 5 The ecclesiastical courts, which followed civil law, de-
clared bequests of personalty to be "in terrorem only" unless they pro-
vided for a gift over.86 The English rule that emerged was that in
terrorem clauses were valid and enforceable when they concerned a de-
vise of land, even in the absence of a gift over.87 The courts, however,
treated forfeiture provisions as "merely in terrorem," that is, an empty
threat, when they concerned personalty and failed to provide for a gift
over if the clause was breached.88 However, the courts enforced in ter-
rorem clauses relating to personalty when the provision included a gift
81. Id. at 1047.
82. 15 Sim. 611, 60 Eng. Rep. 757 (1847) (affd by the Lord Chancellor in 16 Sim. 482).
83. Id. at 762.
84. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 59; Koren, supra note 60, at 176.
85. See Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 547 (1869) (citations omitted).
86. See id.




over.89 The Master of the Rolls wrote, "when the legacy is once vested in
the devisee over, equity cannot fetch it back again." 9°
E. UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT
In 1869, an American court for the first time directly ruled on the valid-
ity of an in terrorem clause. 91 The will in question had bequeathed $600
to William Bradford and contained the following provision: "Now, if any
of my heirs is dissatisfied and goes to law to break this will, then my will is
and I direct that they shall have no part of my estate, and I debar them
from any part of my estate whatever. '92 The executor filed suit for con-
struction of the will to determine the validity and effect of this in terrorem
clause because Bradford had instituted an unsuccessful action to contest
and set aside the will. The lower court held that the clause was valid and
that, consequently, Bradford had forfeited his legacy.93 The court then
rejected the common law rule in England of upholding no-contest clauses
relating to realty, but treating no-contest clauses with respect to person-
alty as merely in terrorem unless the clause provided for a gift over of the
forfeited legacy. The court explained its decision as follows.
In regard to both [devises of realty and bequests of personalty], it is
the duty of the courts to carry out the intention of the testator, unless
that intention be contrary to the policy of the law. No considerations
of public policy require that an heir should contest the doubtful
questions of fact or of law upon which the validity of a devise or a
bequest may depend. The determination of such questions ordina-
rily affects only the interests of the parties to the controversy ....
Hence we assume that in this country, any such condition, which is
reasonable,-as one against disputing one's will surely is, as nothing
can be more in conformity to good policy than to prevent litiga-
tion,-will be held binding and valid. 94
Subsequently, in 1898, the United States Supreme Court examined the
validity of an in terrorem provision in Smithsonian Institution v. Meech.95
The testator had devised the majority of his estate, including a house he
had purchased in the name of his late wife, to the Smithsonian Institute.
After making sundry bequests to his own relatives, the testator left $1,000
to be divided among his late wife's sister and brothers subject to an in
terrorem provision stating that "[t]hese bequests are all made upon the
89. See Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Atk. 398, 404 (1737) (citing Cleaver v. Spurling, 2 P.W.
526, 528, 24 Eng. Rep. 846, 847 (1729)).
90. Cleaver v. Spurling, 2 P.W. 526, 528, 24 Eng. Rep. 846, 847 (1729).
91. See Bradford, 19 Ohio St. at 546; see also Koren, supra note 60, at 176.
92. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. at 546.
93. See id. at 547 (the forfeited legacy passed to the testator's general residuary benefi-
ciaries in the absence of a gift over).
94. Id. at 547-48.
95. 169 U.S. 398, 413-15 (1898). See also Brownder, supra note 58, at 332 (noting that




condition that the legatees acquiesce in this will, and I hereby bequeath
the share or shares of any disputing this will to the residuary legatee here-
inafter named. '96
After the testator's death, his late wife's sister and brothers claimed
title to the property, which was held in the name of his late wife, through
intestate succession. The court first found an implied resulting trust for
the benefit of the testator over this property and then determined that
the contest caused the forfeiture of the legacy left to his late wife's sib-
lings. The court justified its decision by relying on the proposition that
[f]rom the earliest case on the subject, the rule is that a man shall not
take a benefit under a will and, at the same time, defeat the provision
of the instrument. If he claims an interest under an instrument, he
must give full effect to it, so far as he is able to do so. He cannot take
what is devised to him, and at the same time, what is devised to an-
other; although, but for the will, it would be his; hence he is driven to
his election to say, which he will take.97
Having reviewed the authorities upholding in terrorem provisions, the
Court adopted the view that forfeiture provisions were to be upheld be-
cause they were consistent with "good law and good morals. '98
After resolving the threshold issue of the validity of in terrorem provi-
sions, the court must determine whether the beneficiary's conduct is a
"contest," which triggers forfeiture. 99 Courts typically conclude that ac-
tions asserting undue influence, coercion, fraud, revocation by subse-
quent instrument, and lack of testamentary capacity are intended to
invalidate the proffered will, thereby frustrating the testator's intent and
96. Meech, 169 U.S. at 398.
97. Id. at 414-15.
98. Id. at 415 (reviewing extensive English history and limited American history of the
effect of in terrorem provisions).
99. See Snook v. Sessoms, 350 S.E.2d 237, 241 (Ga. 1986) (noting that whether no-
contest clause was violated depends upon the definition of "contest," which is determined
on case-by-case basis); see also Varney v. Superior Court (Antolin), 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865,
873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (defining contest narrowly so action would not be ruled as pro-
ceeding that would trigger in terrorem provision). In Varney, the court, in considering that
the will was drafted by an attorney, decided to use the technical definition provided by the
California Probate Code. See id. at 871. The California Probate Code defines a contest as
"an attack in a proceeding on an instrument or on a provision in an instrument." CAL.
PROB. CODE § 21300(a) (Deering 1991). The court ruled that the cause of action, which
sought recovery of property under an oral contract, was not a contest. See Varney, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 874; see also Poag v. Winston, 241 Cal. Rptr. 330, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(interpreting provisional language and defining "contest" as "encouragement or assertion
of any claim or proceeding which seeks to nullify or prevent the successful implementation
of any part or all of the declaration of trust").
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triggering a forfeiture. 100 In contrast, the most frequently cited examples
of actions that do not result in forfeiture are suits calling for the construc-
tion or interpretation of wills to ascertain the testators' true legal mean-
ing rather than to render the instruments void or nullify any of their
provisions.10'
Il. MODERN APPROACHES FOLLOWED IN THE
UNITED STATES
In the United States today, courts typically adopt one of four major
approaches when evaluating in terrorem clauses. 02 Courts treat such
clauses as (1) void, (2) valid but usually ineffective as overbroad, (3) gen-
erally valid, or (4) valid unless the contestant brought the will contest in
good faith and with probable cause. 10 3 This section details each of these
four methods of evaluating in terrorem provisions.
100. See Barry v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (negat-
ing devise under will because beneficiary filed suit alleging lack of mental capacity, fraud,
coercion, and undue influence); In re Lefranc's Estate, 239 P.2d 617, 620-22 (Cal. 1952)
(establishing suit to revoke probate of will on assertion testator was of unsound mind is
contest intended to thwart testator's intended disposition); In re Estate of Markham, 115
P.2d 866, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (announcing that the court could not conceive of more
outright and direct attack upon validity of will than by filing contest that is based upon
fraud and lack of mental capacity); South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 962 (authorizing
forfeiture because testator's children as beneficiaries initiated suit on ground that testator
was of unsound mind); Hurley v. Blankenship, 267 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Ky. 1954) (applying
forfeiture clause because contest brought upon several allegations including lack of testa-
mentary capacity and undue influence); Dainton v. Watson, 658 P.2d 79, 80 (Wyo. 1983)
(holding that forfeiture was mandatory because beneficiary initiating suit alleging will inva-
lid on grounds of improper execution, incompetency of testator, and undue influence); see
also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-407 (1982) (establishing that contestant of will has burden of
establishing undue influence, duress, mistake, revocation, lack of testamentary capacity,
lack of testamentary intent, or fraud). See generally Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation,
What Constitutes Contest or Attempt to Defeat Will Within Provision Thereof Forfeiting
Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 3 A.L.R.5th 590, 661-67 (1992) (surveying broad authority
that finds contests brought under allegations of undue influence, duress, lack of testamen-
tary capacity, fraud, and coercion decided as matter of law); Validity and Enforceability,
supra note 3, at 373 (identifying most frequent grounds for contesting will being lack of
testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, forgery, improper execution, or revocation
by subsequent will).
101. See, e.g., Griffin v. Sturges, 40 A.2d 758, 760 (Conn. 1944) (determining that when
action is brought to secure interpretation of will, it is not "contest" within forfeiture provi-
sion); South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 963 (acknowledging that action initiated to deter-
mine construction of will or any of its parts is not held to breach forfeiture provision
because action is not brought to invalidate will, but to ascertain its true legal meaning);
Calvery v. Calvery, 55 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1932) (holding that purpose of suit was to
construe provision of will not contest validity); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 21320(a)
(Deering 1991) (authorizing declaratory relief without forfeiture). The California statute
provides that, "[i]f an instrument containing a no contest clause is or has become irrevoca-
ble, a beneficiary ... may apply to the court for a determination of whether a particular
motion, petition, or other act by the beneficiary would be a contest within the terms of the
no contest clause." Id. See generally Jack, supra note 7, at 731 (discussing determination of
what constitutes a will contest).
102. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 54; Koren, supra note 60, at 177.
103. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 54; Koren, supra note 60, at 177.
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A. IN TERROREM PROVISIONS TREATED AS VOID
The blanket unenforceability of in terrorem provisions typically has a
statutory basis. Two states, Indiana 10 4 and Florida,105 have statutes ren-
dering in terrorem clauses invalid and unenforceable under all circum-
stances. 106 These states refuse to allow a testator to interfere with their
citizens' ability to utilize the justice system to ascertain their rights and
duties.'0 7 Some commentators assert that this approach encourages dis-
satisfied beneficiaries to threaten litigation to gain bargaining power.'08
The 1853 South Carolina case of Mallet v. Smith'0 9 provides insight into
the judicial reasoning that in terrorem clauses are void. Although the ma-
jority held that an in terrorem provision containing a gift over in the event
of a contest was valid, one justice wrote further on the subject." 0
Without intention or authority to commit the Court to this extent, I
express my own opinion, in which Chancellor Johnston fully concurs,
that a condition subsequent of this description is void, whether there
be a devise over or not, as trenching on the "liberty of the law,"...
and violating public policy. . . .It is the interest of the State, that
every legal owner should enjoy his estate, and that no citizen should
be obstructed by the risk of forfeiture from ascertaining his rights by
the law of the land. It may be politic to encourage parties in the
adjustment of doubtful rights by arbitration or by private settlement;
but it is against the fundamental principles of justice and policy to
inhibit a party from ascertaining his rights by appeal to the tribunals
established by the State to settle and determine conflicting claims. If
there be any such thing as public policy, it must embrace the right of
a citizen to have his claims determined by law."'
Although this rationale has not gained widespread acceptance as a basis
for deeming in terrorem provisions void, it has been cited as forming the
basis for the widely adopted probable cause exception to their
enforceability. 112
104. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-2 (Michie 1976).
If, in any will admitted to probate in any of the courts of this state, there is a
provision or provisions providing that if any beneficiary thereunder shall
take any proceeding to contest such will or to prevent the admission thereof
to probate, or provisions to that effect, such beneficiary shall thereby forfeit
any benefit which said will made for said beneficiary, such provision or provi-
sions shall be void and of no force or effect.
Id.
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.517 (West 1995) ("A provision in a will purporting to pe-
nalize any interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating
to the estate is unenforceable.").
106. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 47 (discussing Indiana statute that declares forfeiture
provision in will void); John A. Warnick, The Ungrateful Living: An Estate Planner's
Nightmare-The Trial Attorney's Dream, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 403, 420 (1989)
(commenting upon statutory exceptions to in terrorem provision in various jurisdictions).
107. See Koren, supra note 60, at 181.
108. See Henry A. Fenn & Edward F. Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate Code: A Mar-
riage of Convenience, 27 FLA. L. REV. 1, 43 (1974); see also Koren, supra note 60, at 181.
109. S.C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.) 12 (1853).
110. See id. at 18.
111. Id. at 19-20. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 54-55.
112. See Leavitt, supra note 2, at 55.
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B. IN TERROREM CLAUSES TREATED AS VALID BUT INEFFECTIVE
BECAUSE OF OVERBREADTH
Courts may refuse to enforce in terrorem clauses when the donor at-
tempts to control beneficiaries in an overwhelming manner. 113 This re-
sult may be due to poorly drafted clauses or overzealous testators. For
example, in In re Estate of Sands,114 the testatrix, who had been the life
beneficiary and trustee of another estate, threatened to revoke all lega-
cies and bequests to any beneficiary of the trust who "file[d] any excep-
tion to [her] account or took any action contrary to her interest. 115 The
court wrote that
[s]uch a testamentary forfeiture, if enforced, could put the benefici-
ary named in her will in the dilemma of taking under the will what in
fact was already his, it having been stolen from him, or taking the
hazard of litigation, with all its expenses, to obtain his due, by seek-
ing to surcharge the deceased fiduciary's estate."16
The court struck down the forfeiture clause with the admonition that "the
enforcement of it would establish a vicious principle of law, dangerous in
its effect, and create a potential instrument of defense in the hands of a
faithless or negligent fiduciary." 117
A New York court examined a similar clause in In re Andrus' Will. 18
The testator left his residuary estate to two inter vivos trusts and included
a forfeiture clause that required all beneficiaries to "by a writing in form
satisfactory to my Executors and/or Trustees.... respectively acquiesce in
the administration,... and approve, ratify and confirm all acts and things
done by the respective trustees ... with respect to ... both or either of
said trust agreement and the income therefrom." 119 The court refused to
enforce the clause, finding it "so comprehensive in its scope as to cover
the entire period of administration of the trusts, and is broad enough to
absolve the trustees during the entire terms of the trusts from all respon-
sibility for their actions, regardless of the legality of their administration
of the trusts."'1 20
A Louisiana Court of Appeals declared an in terrorem clause "contra
bonos mores, null in its entirety and therefore regarded as if it were not in
the will."' 121 The clause at issue was contained in the testator's ho-
lographic will and provided for forfeiture of the legacies to the testator's
two nieces if "any heir" challenged the will.122 A nephew who was not
named as a beneficiary contested the will.123 The court wrote, "[u]nder
113. See id.; Koren, supra note 60, at 181.
114. 62 Pa. 153 (1949).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 154.
117. Id. at 155.
118. 281 N.Y.S. 831 (1935).
119. Id. at 840.
120. Id. at 852.
121. Succession of Kern, 252 So. 2d 507, 509 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
122. Id. at 510.
123. See id. at 509.
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the circumstances, the legatees are virtually helpless and at the mercy of
any heir not mentioned in the will. Such an heir need only threaten to
file suit in order to force a legatee to surrender a portion of his legacy to
prevent the have-not heir from instituting legal proceedings.' 12 4 Accord-
ingly, this court concluded that "[s]uch a provision is repugnant to law
and good morals and cannot be sanctioned by the courts."'1 25
C. 1N TERROREM CLAUSES TREATED AS VALID WITHOUT EXCEPTION
Several courts have decided that in terrorem provisions contained in
valid wills are entitled to enforcement without exception. For example,
the Alabama Supreme Court stated that "[t]he testator possessed the
right of disposing of his property as he saw fit, so long as he violated no
law or established principles of sound public policy. He could bestow or
withhold benefactions, as an attribute of the jus-disponendi, without re-
gard to considerations of justice, or of caprice."' 26
In Rudd v. Searles,127 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
jected the contestant's assertion that it should adopt the good faith, prob-
able cause exception to the enforceability of in terrorem provisions. The
court reasoned that this exception would violate the "deliberately ex-
pressed purpose of the testator" and "would also deprive the donee of
the gift over in case of contest by the first named beneficiary" under the
will.' 28 Furthermore, due to the invariable exposure of the private and
personal affairs of the testator during a will contest, along with the result-
ing animosities and aroused hostilities among the testator's family mem-
bers, "a[n] [in terrorem] clause of this nature may contribute to the fair
reputation of the dead and to the peace and harmony of the living."'1 29
In Rossi v. Davis,1 30 the Supreme Court of Missouri discussed the im-
portant policies that support the strict enforcement of in terrorem clauses.
It must be conceded that.., a person may dispose of his property as
he wishes. A prospective heir has, generally speaking, no vested
right in his ancestor's property. If there be a will, the legatee or devi-
see takes thereunder what the will gives him and subject to the con-
ditions thereby imposed. He may contest the will and show, if he
can, that it is not the will of his ancestor, whereupon the whole pur-
ported will falls. But if it be established that it is in fact the ances-
tor's will, then it would seem the will must stand, not in part but in
toto. One cannot claim under a will and against it at the same time.
He takes according to the will, or, so far as concerns the will, not at
all. "It is a general principle of law that one cannot claim under a
will and against it too, and one who accepts a beneficial interest
under a will thereby adopts the whole will and renounces every right
124. Id. at 510.
125. Id.
126. Donegan, 70 Ala. at 505.
127. 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 133 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1939).
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or claim that is inconsistent with the will.' 13 1
In 1943, the Court of Chancery of New Jersey wrote, "we do not recog-
nize, as do some jurisdictions, exceptions or limitations of the rule [that in
terrorem clauses are valid], . . . whether there is a gift over and whether
the contest is in good or bad faith or on probable cause."'1 32 The court
continued its strong affirmation of in terrorem clauses when it stated that
"in New Jersey the right of a testator to dispose of his property and to
impose valid conditions against contest is established, thus upholding the
right of a testator to say to his legatee, devisee or beneficiary-take what
I offer or take nothing at all.' 33
Rhode Island took a similar approach in Elder v. Elder.34 A devisee
contested a will in the face of an in terrorem clause on grounds of undue
influence, lack of testamentary capacity, and failure to satisfy the requi-
site formalities. 135 The justices' research revealed that courts upholding
the validity of in terrorem clauses had found nothing in reason or legal
principle to support a gift over requirement or a good faith, probable
cause exception.' 36 Instead, courts applied "the well-established rule of
construction of wills by which effect is given to the clearly-expressed in-
tent of the testator so long as the condition attached to the gift violates no
positive rule of law or public policy."'1 37 The court adhered "to the cardi-
nal rule of construction.., whereby the whole will of the testator must be
given effect according to its clearly expressed intent if it is not contrary to
law or public policy."'1 38 A testator is not obligated to leave a gift to his
child, nor is a child obligated to accept one, with or without a condi-
tion.139 Further, a child has no duty, either individually or as a result of
public policy, to contest the validity of his parent's will. 140 "Certainly,
effect can be given to these legal principles without depriving a benefici-
ary of his freedom to contest the will.''141 Since the son, in this case,
challenged the will, it cannot be said that the clause deprived him of his
legal right to do so. Accordingly, the court concluded that an in terrorem
131. Id. at 372 (citations omitted). In Rossi, the court explained how an in terrorem
clause does not interfere with a contestant's access to the courts as follows:
He may, without legal restraint, submit to the court the question, is the
purported instrument in fact the will of the maker? If it be adjudged that it is
not, he wins. It be adjudged that it is, he loses. But every litigant takes and
must take the chance to win or lose in a lawsuit. There is no obligation on
the part of a disappointed legatee or beneficiary to question the sanity of him
from whom the gift comes-or, we may add, to question whether or not the
purported instrument was the product of undue influence.
Id.
132. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Osborne, 33 A.2d 103, 104 (N.J. Ch. 1943).
133. Id. at 105.
134. 120 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1956).
135. See id. at 817.
136. See id. at 818.
137. Id.





clause would not restrain an individual's liberty of action under the law,
because "it is only after a beneficiary has contested a will unsuccessfully
that the instant question of forfeiture becomes material.
142
In 1983, the Wyoming Supreme Court was faced with the issue for the
first time in Dainton v. Watson.143 The court chose not to observe the
probable cause, good faith exception. 144 After considering the long-
standing Wyoming policy of following the testator's clear and unambigu-
ous language, the justices reasoned that because the in terrorem clause
"quite unambiguously" did not exempt beneficiaries who brought a con-
test in good faith or with probable cause, it would be an improper judicial
construction for the court to apply the terms of the clause differently than
expressed by the testator. 145 The court found additional support for this
position in the state legislature's refusal to incorporate the Uniform Pro-
bate Code's good faith, probable cause exception in Wyoming's newly
revised probate code. 146 The court refused to take a judicial activist role
when it wrote that "[i]f public policy favors the adoption of provisions
similar to those found in § 3-905 of the U.P.C., then it is for the legisla-
ture to make those provisions part of the probate law of Wyoming and
not the courts."'1 47
D. IN TERROREM CLAUSES TREATED AS VALID UNLESS CONTEST
BROUGHT WITH GOOD FAITH AND PROBABLE CAUSE
(UNIFORM PROBATE CODE APPROACH)
The majority of American jurisdictions refuse to enforce in terrorem
clauses if the contestants act with good faith and probable cause. 148 The
origins of this exception are found in the 1688 English case of Powell v.
Morgan,149 where, without explanation, the court simply stated that the
contestant had "probabilis causa litigandi," and that consequently no for-
feiture would result.150 The first American case to cite the probable
cause exception was the 1863 Pennsylvania case of Chew's Appeal.151
However, the court did not rule on the applicability of the exception be-
cause the justices concluded that the beneficiary's action did not fall
within the scope of the conduct the in terrorem provision prohibited. 152
Today, at least eleven states that recognize the general validity of in ter-
rorem provisions have created a judicial good faith, probable cause
142. Id.
143. 658 P.2d 79, 81 (Wyo. 1983). See also Warnick, supra note 106, at 420 (discussing
Wyoming's adoption of the strict construction of no-contest clauses).
144. See Dainton, 658 P.2d at 82.
145. Id. at 81.
146. See id. at 82.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., Koren, supra note 60, at 177.
149. 2 Vern. 90, 23 Eng. Rep. 668 (Ch. 1688).
150. Id. at 668-69.
151. 45 Pa. 228 (1863) (surveying early authorities that allowed exception to forfeiture
if probable cause existed).





In one of the first cases to apply a judicial good faith, probable clause
exception, the justices of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
carefully explained the public policies supporting their determination.
The law prescribes who may make a will and how it shall be made;
that it must be executed in a named mode, by a person having testa-
mentary capacity and acting freely, and not under undue influence.
The law is vitally interested in having property transmitted by will
under these conditions, and none other. Courts cannot know
whether a will, good on its face, was made in conformity to statutory
requirements ... unless these matters are presented to the courts.
And those only who have an interest in the will will have the disposi-
tion to lay the facts before the court. If they are forced to remain
silent, upon penalty of forfeiture. . ., the court will be prevented by
the command of the testator from ascertaining the truth, and the
devolution of property will be had in a manner against both statutory
and common law. Courts exist to ascertain the truth. . ., and a right
of devolution which enables a testator to shut the door of truth and
prevent the observance of the law is a mistaken public policy. 154
Because of the problematic nature of waiting for the courts to decide
that a good faith, probable cause exception is appropriate, the legislatures
of many states have enacted statutes imposing this limitation. 155 The stat-
utory exception is usually applicable without regard to the reason for the
contest.156 A few states, however, limit the application of the exception
153. See South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 963; In re Estate of Cocklin, 17 N.W.2d
129, 135 (Iowa 1945); In re Estate of Foster, 376 P.2d 784, 786 (Kan. 1962); Hartz, 77
N.W.2d at 171; Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278; Ryan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 70 S.E.2d
853, 856-57 (N.C. 1952); Wadsworth v. Brigham, 259 P. 299, 306-07 (Or. 1927); In re Estate
of Friend, 58 A. 853, 854-56 (Pa. 1904); Rouse v. Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 135 (S.C. 1912); Tate
v. Camp, 245 S.W. 839, 842 (Tenn. 1922); In re Estate of Chappell, 221 P. 336, 338 (Wash.
1923); Dutterer v. Logan, 137 S.E. 1, 3 (W. Va. 1927); In re Will of Keenan, 205 N.W. 1001,
1006 (Wis. 1925). See generally Geisinger v. Geisinger, 41 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 1950) (dis-
cussing history, definition, and policy reasons behind probable cause exception); Validity
and Enforceability, supra note 3, at 379 (summarizing various court determinations of what
constitutes probable cause).
154. South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 963.
155. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-905, 8 U.L.A. 383 (1982) (mandating exception due
to desire to ensure will's validity). The Uniform Probate Code provides that "[a] provision
in a will purporting to penalize any interested person from contesting the will or instituting
other proceedings relating to the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for insti-
tuting proceedings." Id. The Uniform Probate Code has been used as a model for the
probable cause exception in 14 states. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.555 (Michie 1996); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3905 (West 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-12-905 (West 1974);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:3-905 (Michie 1997); IDAHO CODE § 15-3-905 (1979); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 3-905 (West 1979); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-413
(1991); MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 700.168 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-517 (West Supp.
1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-537 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-24,103 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-47 (West 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-20-05 (1996); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-3-905 (1993). See generally Leavitt, supra note 2, at 47 (surveying variation of
legal treatment of forfeiture clause from jurisdiction to jurisdiction); Warnick, supra note
106, at 420 (discussing statutory and judicial exceptions to strict forfeiture under in ter-
rorem provisions).
156. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:3-905; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-517; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-47. These statutes state: "A provision in a will purporting to penalize
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to certain types of contests. 157
Both the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States
Laws and the American Law Institute advocate the good faith, probable
cause exception. The Uniform Probate Code states that an in terrorem
provision may not be enforced if probable cause exists for initiating the
will contest. 158 The Restatement (Second) of Property similarly limits the
enforceability of an in terrorem provision if "there was probable cause for
making the contest or attack."'1 59
IV. TEXAS JURISPRUDENCE
Although Texas courts have an established tradition of enforcing in ter-
rorem provisions, this area of the law is currently unsettled because no
statute or Texas Supreme Court case exists that directly addresses
whether Texas imposes the good faith, probable cause exception. This
section details the development of Texas law relating to no-contest
clauses and demonstrates how Texas has reached its current state of un-
any interested person from contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to
the estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings."
157. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21306 (Deering 1991). This statute provides that "[a]
no contest clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to the extent the beneficiary, with
probable cause, brings a contest that is limited to either or both of the following grounds:
(a) Forgery; (b) Revocation." In addition, CAL. PROB. CODE § 21307 provides:
A no contest clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to the extent the
beneficiary, with probable cause, contests a provision that benefits any of the
following persons:
(a) A person who drafted or transcribed the instrument.(b) A person who gave directions to the drafter of the instrument con-
cerning dispositive or other substantive contents of the provision or who di-
rected the drafter to include the no contest clause in the instrument, but this
subdivision does not apply if the transferor affirmatively instructed the
drafter to include the contents of the provision or the no contest clause.
(c) A person who acted as a witness to the instrument.
See also N.Y. ESTATE, POWERS, AND TRUST LAW § 3-3.5(b) (McKinney 1981). This statute
provides:
A condition, designed to prevent a disposition from taking effect in case
the will is contested by the beneficiary, is operative despite the presence or
absence of probable cause for such contest, subject to the following:
(1) Such a condition is not breached by a contest to establish that the will
is a forgery or that it was revoked by a later will, provided that such contest is
based on probable cause.
However, the in terrorem clause is not effective against an infant or an incompetent bring-
ing a contest, regardless of probable cause. Id. § 3-3.5(b)(2) ("An infant or incompetent
may affirmatively oppose the probate of a will without forfeiting any benefit thereunder.").
158. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-905; McGOVERN, supra note 3, at 586 (noting that
Uniform Probate Code does not enforce in terrorem provision when contest brought with
probable cause).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 9.1 (1983) ("An otherwise effective pro-
vision in a will or other donative transfer, which is designed to prevent the acquisition or
retention of an interest in property in the event there is a contest of the validity of the
document transferring the interest or an attack on a particular provision of the document,
is valid, unless there was probable cause for making the contest or attack."). See generally
Robert C. Reed, Note, No-Contest Clause in Wills, 23 U. PiTt. L. REV. 767, 772-73 (1962)
(discussing original Restatement's limitation of the probable cause exception to situations
involving revocation by a later will or forgery).
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certainty, which reduces the ability of testators and beneficiaries to accu-
rately predict the results of their actions, whether it be to include in
terrorem provisions or to contest a will in the face of such clauses.
A. THE EARLY CASES: IN TERROREM CLAUSES ENFORCED WITHOUT
REGARD TO THE REASON FOR THE CONTESTS
Texas lower courts have, in two instances, upheld without qualification,
the validity of in terrorem provisions. 160 Both cases, Massie v. Massie,161
litigated in 1908, and Perry v. Rogers,162 decided in 1908, established the
strict application of in terrorem provisions by decreeing absolute forfei-
ture without reference to the beneficiary's good faith or whether the ben-
eficiary had probable cause to bring the contest.1 63 Neither contestant
filed a writ of error to the Texas Supreme Court, thereby leaving the deci-
sions without higher court review.
B. TEXAS SUPREME COURT APPROVES THE GOOD FAITH, PROBABLE
CAUSE EXCEPTION, BUT ONLY IN DICTA
The first Texas case to acknowledge the existence of the probable cause
exception was the 1932 Texas Supreme Court opinion of Calvery v.
Calvery.164 Although the court found that the contestant's suit was
outside the scope of the in terrorem provision and therefore was not a
contest of the will, 165 the court nonetheless stated that "[tihe great weight
160. See Massie, 118 S.W. at 219 (declaring absolute forfeiture because child of testator
alleging property that was devised under father's will was community property rather than
separate property, which would in effect disrupt disposition of estate and thwart testator's
intent); Perry v. Rogers, 114 S.W. 897, 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (finding that
trespass-to-try-title suit and partition of property was contest to challenge disposition of
property); see also Jack, supra note 7, at 728 (summarizing holdings and rationale for in-
voking strict forfeiture); Catalano, supra note 100, at 617 (surveying Perry decision and
court's rational). See generally Validity and Enforceability, supra note 3, at 374-76 (discuss-
ing case law authority that holds in terrorem provisions are valid and enforceable).
161. 118 S.W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ).
162. 114 S.W. 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ).
163. See Massie, 118 S.W. at 219 (ruling that in terrorem provision mandates absolute
forfeiture without discussion of, or reference to the beneficiary's good faith or probable
cause); Perry, 114 S.W. at 899 (decreeing absolute forfeiture without reference to probable
cause); see also Gunter v. Pogue, 672 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (discussing Perry and Massie decisions noting their strict application of
forfeiture provisions without addressing probable cause exception); Joseph S. Horrigan,
Litigating Will Contests, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRO-
GRAM, 17TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING AND PROBATE COURSE P-1, P-6
(1993) (acknowledging strict application of forfeiture provisions under Perry and Massie
decisions). See generally Hugo M. Pfaltz, Jr., "In Terrorem" Ne Terreamus, 52 Ky. L.J. 769,
772 (1964) (illustrating strict application of forfeiture provision by using Perry decision).
164. 55 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex. 1932) (stating in dicta that many jurisdictions adopt the
good faith, probable cause exception); see also Jack, supra note 7, at 729 (indicating
Calvery decision noted probable cause exception, but only in dicta); cf Olin L. Brownder,
Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contest Re-Examined, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 320, 337
(1949) (discussing Calvery decision and asserting that court held forfeiture provision is not
violated if action proceeded under good faith and upon probable cause).
165. See Calvery, 55 S.W.2d at 530 (finding that beneficiary initiated action to obtain
construction of will to ascertain whether her devised interest was in fee simple or a life
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of authority sustains the rule that forfeiture of rights under the terms of a
will will not be enforced where the contest of the will was made in good
faith and upon probable cause. '166 The court tempered this observation
by stating, "We do not intend to declare whether a forfeiture would result
from a suit merely to ascertain the intent of a testator, regardless of the
contestant's good faith and regardless of the existence of probable cause
for the institution of the suit. No such case is before us." 167 Notwith-
standing this limitation, lower courts have subsequently used Calvery as
evidence of the court's likely approval of the probable cause exception
when such a case is eventually presented. 16
C. MODERN CASES
1. Status of Good Faith, Probable Cause Exception Unclear
The first case after Calvery to address the probable cause exception
was First Methodist Episcopal Church South v. Anderson,169 decided in
1937. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, relying on Calvery, asserted the
existence of the probable cause exception to forfeiture by stating, "[W]e
do not think a suit brought in good faith and upon probable cause to
ascertain the intention of the testator ... should be construed as an effort
estate); Jack, supra note 7, at 729 (surveying Calvery decision and noting suit was to con-
strue will to ascertain interest in land).
166. Calvery, 55 S.W.2d at 530; accord Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 432
A.2d 890, 902-904 (N.J. 1981) (discussing split of authority in applying forfeiture exception
but favoring majority of states that apply exception upon probable cause); Elder, 120 A.2d
at 818 (surveying authority favoring probable cause exception); see also BOWE & PARKER,
supra note 5, § 44.29, at 471 (discussing the exception to strict forfeiture if a contest is
brought in good faith and asserting that the exception conforms with public policy). But
see Womble, 95 S.E.2d at 217 (asserting position denying exception to forfeiture based
upon majority of jurisdictions); Cocklin, 17 N.W.2d at 135 (expressing strong disagreement
with Calvery assessment of numerical weight of authority upholding exception to forfei-
ture). See generally Validity and Enforceability, supra note 3, at 376-81 (surveying author-
ity upholding and denying exception to strict forfeiture if contest based on good faith and
probable cause).
167. Calvery, 55 S.W.2d at 530-31; see Jack, supra note 7, at 729 (commeniing upon
court's decision in Calvery to construe will and court's statement that no case was before
them to rule on the good faith and probable cause exception).
168. See Hammer, 819 S.W.2d at 673 (citing to Calvery and stating that "a forfeiture of
rights under the terms of a will will not be enforced where the contest of the will was made
in good faith and upon probable cause"); Gunter, 672 S.W.2d at 843-44 (surveying Texas
case law concerning probable cause exception); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275, 287 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954) (discussing probable cause exception to forfeiture and quot-
ing Calvery and First Methodist decisions), rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.
1955); First Methodist, 110 S.W.2d at 1184 (citing to Calvery and asserting that "the great
weight of authorities sustain the rule" that forfeiture will be denied when contest is
brought under probable cause); see also Jack, supra note 7, at 729-31 (surveying Texas case
law acknowledging good faith, probable cause exception).
169. 110 S.W.2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ dism'd) (holding that suit was
not "contest," but brought to ascertain extent of ownership in property devised to benefici-
ary under decedent's will); see Jack, supra note 7, at 729-30 (discussing First Methodist
decision and noting suit brought to interpret will); Catalano, supra note 100, at 659 (stating
that First Methodist court found suit instituted to interpret will and determine extent of
property interest devised under will).
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to vary the purpose and intention of the will.' 170 The court did not ad-
dress the issue of probable cause because the suit was brought to ascer-
tain the extent of the beneficiary's bequest and, therefore, was not a
contest. 171 However, the court implied that the action was beyond the
scope of the forfeiture provision because it was brought upon probable
cause.
172
Similarly, in the 1954 case of Hodge v. Ellis,173 a beneficiary filed a
trespass-to-try-title suit to protect his interest in property devised under
the will. 174 The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals, relying on Calvery
and First Methodist, announced that the action was initiated in good faith
and upon probable cause and, therefore, did not constitute grounds for
forfeiture. 175 Relying upon reasoning similar to the First Methodist opin-
ion, the Hodge court distinguished the suit from an action brought to
thwart the testator's desires as stated in the will; however, the court noted
that had the suit been a contest, the forfeiture provision would be
operative. 176
Notwithstanding both courts' admissions that probable cause was not
in issue, neither decision represents a correct delineation and application
of the principles of the probable cause exception. 177 To properly apply
170. First Methodist, 110 S.W.2d at 1184; see Gunter, 672 S.W.2d at 843 (discussing First
Methodist announcement that suit brought under good faith and upon probable cause
should not be defeated by forfeiture provision); Cocklin, 17 N.W.2d at 135 (asserting First
Methodist decision announced approval of good faith and probable cause exception be-
cause of strong support by numerous jurisdictions); Kuelthau, supra note 73, at 532
(describing First Methodist opinion as recognizing good faith, probable cause exception).
171. See First Methodist, 110 S.W.2d at 1184.
172. See id. The court stated that the beneficiary's action was for the purpose of inter-
preting the will and determining the extent of ownership in property received under the
will rather than one to thwart the testator's desires. See also Leavitt, supra note 2, at 73
(citing First Methodist case as support for contention that declaratory action brought to
construe will is not contest within scope of in terrorem provision); Catalano, supra note
100, at 659 (stating that First Methodist court found suit instituted to interpret will and
determine extent of property interest devised under will).
173. 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 277
S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1955).
174. See id. at 287 (recognizing that suit was initiated by beneficiary to establish title to
real estate because although property was held in deceased wife's name, property was
purchased with community funds, therefore, making real estate community property,
which effected distribution of estate).
175. See id. (citing to Calvery and concluding that the trespass-to-try-title suit was insti-
tuted in good faith and upon probable cause because of absence of a showing of bad faith).
176. See id.; see also Jack, supra note 7, at 730 (discussing Hodge decision and noting
court's assertion that because suit brought in good faith and upon probable cause, it was
not intended to thwart testator's will and thus forfeiture would not be appropriate);
Kuelthau, supra note 73, at 532 (citing Hodge for support in asserting that majority of
states recognize good faith, probable cause exception to forfeiture).
177. See, e.g., Ryan, 70 S.E.2d at 855-56 (finding probable cause for initiation of suit
precludes invoking forfeiture provision); Haynes, 432 A.2d at 904 (declining to enforce in
terrorem provision when action brought upon probable cause and in good faith); Seymour,
600 P.2d at 278 (declaring that when contest brought in good faith and upon probable
cause forfeiture will not be invoked). A prerequisite to the application of the probable
cause exception precluding forfeiture under the in terrorem provision is that the action of
the beneficiary must be determined to be a "contest" that challenges the testator's will or
any of its provisions. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:3-905; MINN. STAT. ANN.
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the probable cause exception, the beneficiary's suit must initially be cate-
gorized as a "contest,"' 178 i.e., a suit brought to thwart the testator's in-
tent.179 Once the suit is established as a contest, forfeiture must occur
unless the court subsequently determines that the beneficiary brought the
action in good faith and had probable cause for so doing.180 Accordingly,
these holdings of the Texas lower courts should not be taken as an indica-
tion that the courts declined to permit forfeitures because of the existence
of probable cause. Instead, the holdings merely reflect that the courts
found that the beneficiary's action to ascertain the intent of the testator
was outside the scope of a "contest," placing the suit beyond the purview
of the forfeiture provision in the first place.
In 1983, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals shed additional light on
the judiciary's thinking with regard to the probable cause exception in the
case of Gunter v. Pogue.18' Although the suit was a direct contest of the
testator's will by three beneficiaries, the trial court refused to enforce the
§ 524.2-517; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-47 ("A provision in a will purporting to penalize any
interested person for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the
estate is unenforceable if probable cause exists for instituting proceedings."); see also UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 3-905 (providing that beneficiary does not forfeit gift if contest upon
probable cause).
178. See In re Hesse's Estate, 157 P.2d 347, 349 (Ariz. 1945) (asserting that legal ques-
tions involved in construction of will or to ascertain meaning of validly executed will are
not grounds of contest that would trigger forfeiture). The court held that any litigated
proceeding concerning the eligibility of an instrument to probate, as distinguished from the
validity of its contents, is considered to be a contest challenging testator's intended disposi-
tion, which triggers the forfeiture provision. Id. See also Hodge, 268 S.W.2d at 287 (find-
ing that forfeiture must follow if purpose of suit is to thwart testator's intent). See generally
Catalano, supra note 100, at 590 (defining "contest" as a term of art meaning a proceeding
to disrupt testator's intended disposition by invalidating will); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
320 (6th ed. 1990) (defining contest as, "To controvert, litigate, call in question, challenge,
"and as specifically used in a no-contest provision as "any legal proceedings designed to
thwart testator's wishes").
179. See, e.g., Hesse, 157 P.2d at 349 (asserting will "contest" is any kind of litigated
controversy concerning the eligibility of an instrument to probate as distinguished from the
effect of the provisions of will); In re Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d 748, 752 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (defining "contest" of will as direct attack upon
decree admitting will to probate); In re Estate of Hottermann, 23 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (declaring "contest" as any legal proceeding which is designed to
thwart testator's wishes as stated in his will); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.
ERTY § 428 cmt. c (1983) (defining "contest" as proceeding intended to challenge probate
of will by asserting improper execution, undue influence, fraud, or lack of testamentary
capacity); JOSEPH H. MURPHY, 1 MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES § G15, at 1-61 (1993) (stating
that proceeding instituted to challenge will is behavior that invokes forfeiture provision).
180. See In re LeFranc's Estate, 239 P.2d 617, 619 (Cal. 1952) (establishing that suit
initiated to invalidate testator's will by claiming that testator was of unsound mind was
contest intended to thwart testator's intended disposition); see also Veltmann v. Damon,
696 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio) (noting forfeiture provision conditional
upon intention of contestant to disrupt testator's intended disposition), afjd in part, rev'd
in part, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1985).
181. 672 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.); see also 10 AL-
OYSIUS A. LEOPOLD & GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS LAW OF WILLS § 52.9, at 465 (2d ed.
1992) (identifying Gunter decision as perhaps one of most thorough discussions of viability
of the good faith, probable cause exception).
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forfeiture required by the in terrorem provision. 182 The non-contesting
beneficiaries asserted that the trial court erred in not giving effect to the
forfeiture provision because the exception for good faith and probable
cause did not exist in Texas, and, in the alternative, they argued that the
contesting beneficiaries did not receive a finding that their contest was
brought under the exception. 183
Although the appellate court agreed with the non-contesting benefi-
ciaries and reversed the trial court, the appellate court dismissed the ap-
peal without making a determination on whether the probable cause
exception exists in Texas. 184 The appellate court focused its attention on
the non-contesting beneficiaries' argument that, even if the exception ex-
isted in Texas, the contestants did not meet the burden of proof necessary
to defeat a forfeiture based upon probable cause. 185 The appellate court
concluded by stating that if the contestants intended to utilize the prob-
able cause exception "it was incumbent upon them to secure a finding on
good faith and probable cause from the judge or jury,"'1 86 which they
never accomplished.
In Hammer v. Powers,187 decided in 1991, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals gave its opinion of the status of the probable cause exception.
Without ruling on whether to recognize the exception, the court cited the
Gunter decision in announcing that to avoid forfeiture, the contestants
must plead and prove their good faith and probable cause in contesting
the will. 188 Consequently, the court upheld the trial court's summary
judgment ruling, finding that the contestants failed to plead or offer any
182. See Gunter, 672 S.W.2d at 841. The testator had written four wills during the three
years before his death; the second, third, and fourth instruments contained forfeiture
clauses. See id. The beneficiaries filed a will contest and offered will number one for pro-
bate, which did not contain the forfeiture provision. See id. at 842. The jury found wills
number one, three, and four defective, and the court subsequently admitted the second will
to probate. See id.
183. See id. at 842.
184. See id. at 843-44 (acknowledging Texas case law history concerning in terrorem
provisions and uncertainty of good faith, probable cause exception, but asserting that issue
was not before them for determination).
185. See id. at 844-45 (summarizing allocation of burden and discussing necessary proof
needed to establish probable cause exception). Although the trial court refused to uphold
the forfeiture provision, the trial judge refused to make any finding on the good faith,
probable cause issue, which precluded the presentment of the issue to the appellate court
for determination. See id.
186. Id. at 845 (at trial, the appellees failed to introduce evidence on good faith, prob-
able cause in defense of their challenge to the probate of the will, which defeated any
possibility of utilizing the exception even if it existed).
187. 819 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
188. See id. at 673; accord Friend, 58 A. at 856 (declaring that contestant had burden of
showing that probable cause existed to contest validity of will); see also ATKINSON, supra
note 3, § 82, at 409 (recognizing that contestant with burden of proof must show contestant
acted with probable cause); JOSEPH H. MURPHY, 2A MURPHY'S WILL CLAUSES § A6, at
110 (Supp. 1993) (surveying allocation of burden of proof in asserting defense of probable
cause and citing opinion of Hammer as illustrative); Lynne McNeil Candler, Annual Survey
of Texas Law: Wills and Trusts, 46 SMU L. REv. 1831, 1833-34 (1993) (discussing Hammer
decision and allocation of burden of proof).
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evidence of probable cause. 189
Although these and many other Texas appellate opinions have touched
peripherally on the good faith, probable cause exception by implying a
general recognition of the exception in Texas case law,190 the dominant
focus of the courts in recent decisions has been the threshold issue of
defining the triggering conduct.191 As a result, courts can easily evade a
direct holding on the validity of the probable cause exception once they
determine that the beneficiary's conduct is not a contest in the first place
and thus does not trigger the in terrorem provision. 192
Based on these cases, an in terrorem provision is not triggered by the
commencement of an action in which a beneficiary seeks to: (1) recover a
property interest in devised or bequeathed property;193 (2) compel an ex-
189. See Hammer, 819 S.W.2d at 673; accord Haynes, 432 A.2d at 904 (finding that
action asserted in good faith and upon probable cause amply supported by evidence in
record); see also Horrigan, supra note 163, at P-8 (summarizing Hammer court's recogni-
tion of probable cause exception as affirmative defense that must be pled and allocation of
burden of proof upon contestant); Candler, supra note 188, at 1833 n.29 (discussing Ham-
mer decision and noting absence of pleadings and proof prohibited court from providing
finding on probable cause).
190. See, e.g., First Methodist, 110 S.W.2d at 1184 (citing to Calvery and asserting that
"the great weight of authorities sustain the rule" that forfeiture will be denied when con-
test is brought under probable cause); Hodge, 268 S.W.2d at 287 (discussing probable cause
exception to forfeiture and quoting Calvery and First Methodist decisions); Gunter, 672
S.W.2d at 843-44 (surveying Texas case law concerning probable cause exception); see also
Brownder, supra note 164, at 338 (indicating Texas case law history of discussing probable
cause exception in favorable manner, which is taken as indication of acceptance in Texas).
191. See, e.g., Veltmann, 696 S.W.2d at 246 (determining validity of deed through suit
did not contest terms of will); Sheffield v. Scott, 662 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding that mere filing of an action without further
action does not trigger forfeiture clause); Reed, 569 S.W.2d at 648 (identifying suit as one
brought to ascertain testator's intent); McGaffey v. Walker, 379 S.W.2d 390, 396 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding suit brought upon insistence that testator's
last will be probated not falling within in terrorem provision precluding forfeiture); Hodge,
268 S.W.2d at 287 (reporting action brought as trespass-to-try-title claim); Roberts v.
Chisum, 238 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, no writ) (ascertaining that
proceeding was brought for will construction); Bethurum v. Browder, 216 S.W.2d 992, 995
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (identifying proceeding as action brought
to partition in kind property received); Upham v. Upham, 200 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding suit initiated for will construction and
accounting).
192. See, e.g., Gunter, 672 S.W.2d at 843-44 (announcing that case was disposed of with-
out deciding whether exception to forfeiture exists in Texas because the issue was not
before court); In re Estate of Minnick, 653 S.W.2d 503, 507-08 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1983,
no writ) (concluding suit filed for accounting, partition, and distribution not contest of
will); Dulak v. Dulak, 496 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973) (filing suit for
damages to property claimed under will not to contest will precluding ruling on probable
cause exception), affd in part, rev'd in part, 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974).
193. See Upham, 200 S.W.2d at 883. The issue raised was whether the property devised
was the separate or community property of the testator, and, therefore, the court held that
the suit was not a "contest" intended to thwart the intent of the testator, but was merely a
request for the construction of the will. See id.; accord South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at
963 (holding that when action is merely one to ascertain construction of will, it will not
violate forfeiture provision because object of suit is to determine true legal meaning);
Wells v. Menn, 28 So. 2d 881, 885 (Fla. 1946) (determining that where purpose of suit is to
ascertain interests under will and not for purpose of challenging will, courts cannot invoke
forfeiture); Leavitt, supra note 2, at 73, n.119 (citing Upham for authoritative support that
declaratory action brought to interpret will is not challenge to will within in terrorem provi-
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ecutor to perform duties;194 (3) ascertain a beneficiary's interest under
the will;195 (4) compel a court to probate the last will of a testator;196 (5)
recover damages for the conversion of assets that were devised or be-
queathed to a contesting beneficiary; 197 (6) construe a provision of the
testator's will;198 (7) request an accounting, partition, or distribution of
sion). See generally Catalano, supra note 100, at 637-41 (asserting that it is uniformly rec-
ognized that an action for construction of will or any of its provisions for determination of
rights and duties under it does not bring action and beneficiary within forfeiture provision).
194. See Bethurum, 216 S.W.2d at 992. When it appeared that the executor did not
settle the estate in a timely manner, the court held that the beneficiary, in bringing suit to
compel the executor to perform his duties as required under the will, did not "contest" the
will. See id. at 995; accord In re Estate of Ikuta, 639 P.2d 400, 407 (Haw. 1981) (holding
that beneficiaries who contested petition for final accounts did not fall under definition of
"contest" because action was to construe will); In re McGovern's Estate, 250 P. 812, 818
(Mont. 1926) (ruling that beneficiaries who initiated suit to compel executor to render final
accounting, settle estate, and deliver possession of real estate to them did not fall within
definition of "contest"). See generally Catalano, supra note 100, at 655-61 (discussing au-
thority stating that proceedings brought against executors for accounting are not "con-
tests" under in terrorem provisions).
195. See Roberts, 238 S.W.2d at 825 (holding the beneficiaries' suit was to determine the
meaning of ambiguous and uncertain language in a will that prohibited the beneficiaries
from ascertaining the nature of their gifts under the will, not a contest); accord Black v.
Herring, 28 A. 1063, 1065 (Md. 1894) (stating that it was improper to determine that bene-
ficiary bringing suit to ascertain interests under will was seeking to thwart intent of testa-
tor); George v. George, 141 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Ky. 1940) (proceeding for declaratory
judgment to determine interest under will due to ambiguous language); In re Ervin's Es-
tate, 79 A.2d 264, 265 (Pa. 1951) (determining that suit was brought to construe will by
referring to entire instrument); Leavitt, supra note 2, at 73 (citing Roberts as authoritative
support for assertion that declaratory suit brought to interpret will's language is not within
provision as "contest"); see also BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, § 44.29, at 473-74 (ac-
knowledging that suit brought to ascertain interest in property devised under will is not a
"contest").
196. See McGaffey, 379 S.W.2d at 396 (holding an action to compel the court to probate
the last will of testator was not within scope of no-contest provision); see also BowE &
PARKER, supra note 5, § 44.29, at 474 (discussing authority denying forfeiture when benefi-
ciary challenges will admitted to probate with another instrument claimed to be proper
will). See generally Catalano, supra note 100, at 637-41 (surveying authority that state's
forfeiture will be denied if beneficiary is instituting suit other than attack on testator's
intended disposition of property).
197. See, e.g., Dulak, 496 S.W.2d at 779-80 (beneficiary's action to recover damages for
the conversion of assets prior to the testator's death that were devised to him under the
will did not trigger forfeiture), affd in part, rev'd in part, 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974); ac-
cord In re Estate of Dow, 308 P.2d 475, 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding action to enforce
claim against estate for value of stocks that were separate property, but had been con-
verted by testator for own use, not to be considered "contest" of testator's will). See gener-
ally Catalano, supra note 100, at 692-93 (discussing authority denying forfeiture upon
action brought on assertion of claim based on tort or wrongful act).
198. See, e.g., Reed, 569 S.W.2d at 645 (holding in response to contention that suit for
declaratory judgment initiated to construe provision of the testator's will had violated the
forfeiture provision, that beneficiaries had not forfeited their interest because the suit was
to ascertain and enforce the testator's intent); accord Hicks v. Rushin, 185 S.E.2d 390, 392
(Ga. 1971) (concluding that will's in terrorem provision prohibiting contests did not apply
to declaratory action, which was search for true legal meaning of testator's intent); Dravo
v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 267 S.W.2d 95, 98-99 (Ky. 1954) (taking position that
suit for declaratory judgment as to whether proposed action would violate forfeiture provi-
sion in testator's will was not intended to thwart testator's intent, but merely to ascertain
meaning of instrument by construction of will); see also McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3,
at 586 (citing Reed decision as supporting the assertion that suits brought to construe testa-
tor's will despite being unsuccessful do not result in forfeiture); Catalano, supra note 100,
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estate assets;19 9 (8) contest a deed that conveyed a beneficiary's inter-
est;2°° (9) determine the effect of a family settlement agreement;201 (10)
challenge another beneficiary's appointment as executor;202 (11) seek re-
dress from executors for breach of their fiduciary duties;20 3 and (12) tes-
at 651 (surveying court's decision in Reed, which found suit brought to ascertain interest
under will); Jack, supra note 7, at 731 (discussing how courts determine what constitutes
contest of will).
199. See Minnick, 653 S.W.2d at 507-08 (stating that it is well settled that requests for
accounting, partition, and distribution of estate assets are not contests within the terms of
in terrorem provisions); Upham, 200 S.W.2d at 883 (holding declaratory judgment for will
construction and accounting is not within definition of contest); Bethurum, 216 S.W.2d at
995 (declaring that an action to compel partition in kind not considered contest); see also
Catalano, supra note 100, at 667-72 (discussing authority declaring proceedings for ac-
counting or settlement of estate not "contest" within in terrorem provisions).
200. See Veltmann, 696 S.W.2d at 246 (determining that intent of testator was undis-
turbed by suit to contest subsequent deed to property that was already devised under will
and outside estate of testator); see also MURPHY, supra note 188, § A2, at 117-18 (discuss-
ing Gunter decision and noting that contestant asserted deed was made under undue influ-
ence but action was not typical action within scope of in terrorem provision that would
constitute contest and trigger forfeiture); Catalano, supra note 100, at 718-19 (surveying
Veltmann decision and indicating that suit initiated to set aside transfer of beneficiary's
interest did not trigger forfeiture).
201. See Hodges, 725 S.W.2d at 268 (finding suit brought to ascertain whether forfeiture
would result from attempted family settlement agreement was not action intended to at-
tack will and thus did not cause forfeiture). See generally Catalano, supra note 100, at 651
(discussing Hodges decision and reasoning behind holding).
202. See, e.g., In re Estate of Newbill, 781 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989,
no writ) (determining that challenging an executor's qualifications does not constitute chal-
lenging validity of will); In re Estate of Hamill, 866 S.W.2d 339, 345 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993, no writ) (acknowledging suit brought to challenge appointment of executor is not an
action to thwart distribution under will, but to carry out wishes of testator that executor be
qualified); accord Estate v. Lewy, 113 Cal. Rptr. 674, 678-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding
that beneficiary's unsuccessful attempt to prevent executor from serving for lack of capac-
ity was not "contest"); see also BowE & PARKER, supra note 5, § 44.29, at 111-12 (acknowl-
edging authority declaring challenge to executor's qualifications is not "contest" of will);
Candler, supra note 188, at 675 (discussing Newbill decision asserting that challenge to co-
beneficiary's appointment as executor does not violate in terrorem provision); cf Sheffield,
662 S.W.2d at 675 (quoting testator's in terrorem provision, which states that "no such
devisee or legatee or beneficiary shall in any manner contest ... or oppose the appoint-
ment of my Independent Executor in any judicial proceeding"); Geisinger v. Geisinger, 41
N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 1950) (holding that action of beneficiary did not come within provi-
sional language prohibiting any heir from causing "trouble or disturbance" in conjunction
to change in named executor in codicil to original will).
203. See McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 679 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ
denied) (suit against executors for breach of their fiduciary duties under the will did not
challenge the validity of the will, but rather questioned the execution of the will's instruc-
tions by the executors, and therefore, as a matter of law, action fell outside the forfeiture
provision); accord Jackson v. Braden, 717 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Ark. 1986) (holding that action
against executor for alleged breach of fiduciary duties not "contest" within forfeiture pro-
vision); Cohen v. Reisman, 48 S.E.2d 113, 114-15 (Ga. 1948) (determining beneficiary
would not forfeit bequest under will for instituting suit against executor for alleged breach
of fiduciary duties). See generally Catalano, supra note 100, at 672-76 (discussing authority
on issue of invoking forfeiture for initiating suit against executor on assertions of miscon-
duct); ATKINsoN, supra note 3, § 82, at 412 (noting claims against executor are generally
held to be outside forfeiture provision). But see Estate of Wojtalewicz v. Woitel, 418
N.E.2d 418, 420-21 (11. 1981) (declaring that beneficiary's conduct within provisional lan-
guage mandating forfeiture, but that it is against public policy to require forfeiture).
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tify in a contest brought by other beneficiaries. 204
Even if the beneficiary's conduct is deemed a contest, courts have
nonetheless been able to avoid directly ruling on whether the good faith,
probable cause exception is followed in Texas. For example, in In re Es-
tate of Hamill,20 5 the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the benefici-
ary's suit actually was a contest because the beneficiary's pursuit of an
appeal of a will contest after reaching the age of majority fell within the
scope of the clause thereby invoking a forfeiture. 20 6 Although the finding
that a bona fide contest had been instituted would normally raise the is-
sue of whether the beneficiary brought the suit in good faith and with
probable cause, the court did not address the exception because the con-
testing beneficiary neglected to file a brief and place the issue before the
appellate court. 20 7
2. Mere Filing Of Contest May Be Insufficient to Trigger Forfeiture
Two appellate courts have addressed the issue of whether the benefici-
ary's act of filing a contest is in itself enough to come within the scope of
an in terrorem clause. In the 1983 case of Sheffield v. Scott,20 8 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District announced that the
mere filing of a suit, without more, was not a contest intended to chal-
lenge the intent of the testator.20 9 The court stated that a motion, in and
204. See Hazen v. Cooper, 786 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990,
no writ) (forfeiture provision expressly prohibited beneficiary from contesting "or in any
manner whatsoever directly or indirectly aid[ing] in any such contest or questioning," how-
ever, the court held that a non-contesting beneficiary's act of testifying during trial did not
trigger a forfeiture citing public policy that denying inheritance because of testimony from
non-contesting beneficiary would discourage full disclosure of facts and circumstances); see
also Horrigan, supra note 163, at P-7, P-8 (surveying Hazen decision and noting public
policy argument by court that penalty for testifying should not be invoked because of pos-
sible restraint on attaining truth); Candler, supra note 188, at 673 (discussing Hazen deci-
sion). Accord Haley v. Pickelsimer, 134 S.E.2d 697, 703 (N.C. 1964) (ruling that providing
aid to minor daughter who challenged testator's will did not result in mother forfeiting her
gift); Elder, 120 A.2d at 821 (holding widow's appearance in son's contest of testator's will
did not come within purview of forfeiture provision). See also BowE & PARKER, supra
note 5, § 44.29, at 474 (concluding that entering voluntary testimony at trial does not vio-
late in terrorem provision). But see In re Estate of Simpson, 595 A.2d 94, 100 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (holding that aid provided to contestant by non-contesting beneficiaries fell
within forfeiture provision and invoked forfeiture). See generally Catalano, supra note 100,
at 708-11 (reviewing case law on application of in terrorem provisions on aid provided by
non-contesting beneficiaries to contesting beneficiaries).
205. 866 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
206. See id. at 343.
207. See id.
208. 662 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
209. See id. at 677; accord Wells v. Menn, 28 So. 2d 881, 885 (Fla. 1947) (holding that
merely filing of caveat against probate of will does not constitute contest intended to
thwart intent of testator); Ayers v. Ayers, 279 S.W. 647, 649 (Ky. 1926) (asserting that
despite filing objection to probate and alleging invalid execution, lack of mental capacity,
and undue influence, withdrawal of motion barred action from falling under in terrorem
provision). But see Cross v. French, 177 A. 456, 457 (N.J. Ch. 1935) (indicating filing of
motion to contest probate of will sufficient to trigger in terrorem provision). See generally
Pfaltz, supra note 163, at 777 (discussing jurisdictional conflict upon declaring mere filing
contest to be within in terrorem provision); Catalano, supra note 100, at 627-30 (surveying
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of itself, is not self-proving and that it is only a pleading that is a neces-
sary vehicle to raise issues.210 Additionally, the court maintained that
because the suit was dismissed prior to a hearing and because the testator
had not expressly prohibited the "mere filing" of a contest, the petition
itself was insufficient to invoke a forfeiture. 211
Subsequently, the Sheffield case was cited with approval by the
Amarillo Court of Appeals in In re Hamill.21 2 The Hamill court agreed
that the filing and dismissal of the suit by the contesting beneficiary was
insufficient to come within the purview of the in terrorem clause.213 The
significance of the rulings in Sheffield and Hamill is that they appear to
authorize a forfeiture immediately upon the filing of a contest if the in
terrorem provision expressly stipulates that the mere filing of a contest is
a triggering event.214
3. Testator's Ability to Waive the Good Faith, Probable Cause
Exception Is Uncertain
The uncertainty of the existence of the good faith, probable cause ex-
ception to forfeiture has led many testators to incorporate language in
their in terrorem provisions triggering forfeiture regardless of the contest-
ant's good faith or probable cause. 21 5 However, there is no clear author-
ity regarding whether this type of language would be effective if Texas
were to adopt the good faith, probable cause exception. 216 Despite this
uncertainty, an express waiver of the exception stands a good chance of
authority on whether objection to probate that is subsequently withdrawn triggers
forfeiture).
210. See Sheffield, 662 S.W.2d at 677; accord In re Estate of Hite, 101 P. 443, 447 (Cal.
1909) (stating that "[i]t does not follow herefrom that the mere filing of a paper contest,
which has been abandoned without action, and has not been employed to thwart the testa-
tor's expressed wishes, need be judicially declared a contest").
211. See Sheffield, 662 S.W.2d at 677. But see South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 962
(determining that although beneficiary who initially appealed from order admitting will to
probate, but subsequently instructed counsel not to pursue appeal, nonetheless forfeited
bequest). See generally Validity and Enforceability, supra note 3, at 31 (discussing holding
and reasoning in the Sheffield case).
212. 866 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
213. See id. at 345. See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 5, § 44.29, at 475 (noting
that forfeiture provision denied effect when initial action is subsequently withdrawn); Jack,
supra note 7, at 731 n.47 (discussing cases holding forfeiture prevented by withdrawing suit
prior to judicial proceeding).
214. See Hamill, 866 S.W.2d at 345 (indicating that the court's decision finds mere filing
insufficient to trigger in terrorem provision, but that the court may have reached different
conclusion if the provision had expressly provided that mere filing was enough to invoke
forfeiture).
215. See, e.g., id. at 339; Dulak, 496 S.W.2d at 781; accord Eversal v. Scarth, 787 P.2d
470, 472 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990). See generally MURPHY, supra note 188, § A6, at 77 (pro-
viding Texas form of in terrorem provision, which provides forfeiture "regardless of
whether or not such proceedings are instituted in good faith and with probable cause").
216. See Hamill, 866 S.W.2d at 341 n.3 (determining issues before court without refer-
ence to provisional language that mandated forfeiture "regardless of whether such pro-
ceeding is instituted in good faith and with probable cause"); Dulak, 496 S.W.2d at 781
(declaring beneficiary's action not "contest" without referring to provisional language au-
thorizing forfeiture despite action being brought in good faith and upon probable cause).
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being given effect even under the established principle of strictly constru-
ing forfeiture provisions.217 On the other hand, a court might not uphold
the waiver if it decides that the waiver is contrary to public policy or if the
court's desire to ensure a will's validity exceeds the court's responsibility
to uphold the testator's intent to prevent will contests. 21 8
4. Writ Histories Add to Unpredictability
When analyzing Texas cases from the lower appellate courts, the writ
histories of the cases must be considered because of the impact they have
on the precedential value of the cases.219 When the Texas Supreme Court
refuses a writ of error without any further designation, the opinion has
the same precedential weight as a full decision from the court.220 Unfor-
tunately, no Texas in terrorem cases bear the "writ refused" designation.
Instead, the majority of cases involving in terrorem provisions that were
appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas were refused a writ of error with
the indication that there was no reversible error.22' The "no reversible"
217. See, e.g., McLendon, 862 S.W.2d at 678 (stressing in terrorem provisions narrowly
construed to fulfill testator's expressed intent); accord CAL. PROB. CODE § 21304 (Deering
1991) (providing that "[i]n determining the intent of the transferor, a no contest clause
shall be strictly construed"). See generally BowE & PARKER, supra note 5, § 44.29, at 471
(describing unpopularity of forfeitures with courts and stating that such clauses are strictly
construed); Horrigan, supra note 163, at P-1, P-5-6 (acknowledging that forfeiture provi-
sions are invoked only when action of beneficiary comes strictly within prohibited con-
duct); Herman F. Selvin, Comment, Terror in Probate, 16 STAN. L. REV. 355, 356 (1964)
(reiterating that because forfeiture provisions are so severe, they must be strictly construed
by court); Catalano, supra note 100, at 611 (discussing provisions invoking forfeitures and
strict adherence to their terms).
218. See Hazen, 786 S.W.2d at 520-21 (establishing that a broad forfeiture provision
that prohibited providing aid by one non-contesting beneficiary to contesting beneficiary at
the expense of losing bequest is against public policy based upon consideration that witness
required to be truthful, which aids in determining validity of instrument); accord Porter v.
Baynard, 28 So. 2d 890, 897 (Fla. 1946) (stressing that authorities are in conflict regarding
strict enforcement of in terrorem provisions and noting that authorities favoring exception
based upon probable cause argue testator did not intend to prevent beneficiary from hav-
ing his uncertain rights judicially determined); Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278 (finding that pub-
lic policy positions in conflict due to desire to enforce intent of testator and ensure will's
validity under circumstances). See generally Horrigan, supra note 163, at P-1, P-7-8 (noting
Hazen court's insistence upon independent testimony without fear of repercussion); Selvin,
supra note 217, at 364 (discussing in detail opposing public policy arguments of strict en-
forcement of in terrorem provisions).
219. See TEXAS LAW REVIEW, TEXAS RULES OF FORM 22-24, 82-85 (9th ed. 1997) (dis-
cussing meaning of the various ways the Texas Supreme Court disposes of applications for
writs of error). See generally Ted Z. Robertson & James W. Paulsen, The Meaning (If Any)
of an "N.R.E.," 48 TEX. B.J. 1306, 1306 (1985) (discussing relative precedential values
placed upon cases depending on their writ histories).
220. See Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 110 S.W.2d 561, 565-66 (Tex. 1937);
Ohler v. Trinity Portland Cement Co., 181 S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1944, no writ). See generally TEXAS RULES OF FORM, supra note 219, at 82 (explaining
meaning of "writ ref'd" designation).
221. See, e.g., Gunter, 672 S.W.2d at 840; Sheffield, 662 S.W.2d at 674; Reed, 569 S.W.2d
at 645; McGaffey, 379 S.W.2d at 390; Bethurum, 216 S.W.2d at 992; Upham, 200 S.W.2d at
880. A substantial number of Texas cases concerning the application of in terrorem provi-
sions and the probable cause exception were not reviewed by the Supreme Court of Texas.
See, e.g., Minnick, 653 S.W.2d at 503; Roberts, 238 S.W.2d at 822. Three cases went before
the Supreme Court of Texas and obtained some measure of substantive action upon the
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error designation greatly limits the precedential value of these cases.222
In substance, the "n.r.e." designation means that the Supreme Court of
Texas is not satisfied that the court of appeals has correctly declared the
law, but finds that the final result presents no error requiring reversal.223
Although the court no longer uses the "n.r.e." designation, its replace-
ment, "writ denied," is quite similar in that it reflects that the court is not
satisfied that the lower court correctly declared the law but believes that
there was no error which requires reversal or which is sufficiently impor-
tant to the jurisprudence of Texas to merit correction. 224
V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Testators and settlors expect that property dispositions contained in
their wills and trusts will take effect as written. To enhance the likelihood
of this occurring, testators often include in terrorem provisions. It is frus-
trating to these Texas citizens and the attorneys who counsel them that
the effect of no-contest clauses is uncertain due to a lack of statutory
authority and the non-definitive nature of the existing judicial opinions.
The ability of Texas testators to preserve their estates, protect their pri-
vacy, and prevent family animosities by avoiding post-mortem litigation is
problematic. This section discusses the wisdom of a legislative solution
and concludes with a proposed statute.
A. POLICIES SUPPORTING STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF IN
TERROREM PROVISIONS WITH LIMITED PROBABLE
CAUSE EXCEPTIONS
In drafting an in terrorem statute, the Texas legislature could follow any
of the approaches discussed in Section II of this Article. The authors
urge that the Texas legislature provide its citizens with a comprehensive
statute that places a priority on the property owner's intentions and
removes the uncertainty from the probate law. Deeming in terrorem
clauses valid subject to limited good faith, probable cause exceptions is
the best approach in that it carefully balances the donor's desires to con-
trol the disposition of the donor's property with the court's responsibility
case. See Veltmann, 696 S.W.2d at 246, affd in part, rev'd in part, 701 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.
1985); Dulak, 496 S.W.2d at 782, affd in part, rev'd in part, 513 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1974);
Hodge, 268 S.W.2d at 287, rev'd on other grounds, 277 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. 1954). One case
was dismissed, which denotes the case was dismissed without examining the merits of the
appeal because of the lack of jurisdiction, mootness, or the case was settled by agreement
of the parties. See First Methodist, 110 S.W.2d at 1177.
222. See TEXAS RULES OF FORM, supra note 219, at 83 (explaining meaning of "writ
ref'd n.r.e." designation); Robertson & Paulsen, supra note 219, at 1306-16 (analyzing prec-
edential value of cases receiving the "n.r.e." designation).
223. See TEXAS RULES OF FORM, supra note 219, at 82 (explaining meaning of "writ
ref'd n.r.e." designation); Robertson & Paulsen, supra note 219, at 1306 (discussing prece-
dential value placed on cases denied writ of error); Gordon Simpson & Kate Wall,
Problems of Precedent Affecting Court of Civil Appeals Opinions, 4 Sw. L.J. 398, 402
(1950) (asserting that placement of "n.r.e." designation is plague on civil appeals opinions).




of making sure beneficiaries and heirs have the ability to pursue their
legal rights without fearing unjustified consequences.
1. Prioritizes Grantor's Intent
"[T]he function of the court is to effect the testator's intent to the
greatest extent possible within the bounds of the law."22 -5 "It has been
repeatedly stated that the intention of the testator is the 'polar star of
construction' to which all other rules must yield. Thus, a will must be
construed according to the intention of the testator, no matter how unu-
sual or unreasonable his intention may be."'2 26 When an in terrorem pro-
vision is used, the grantor intends to condition the gifts of each
beneficiary on that beneficiary not attempting to alter the dispositive
scheme and, thus, the provision should be given effect, unless enforce-
ment violates a positive rule of law or public policy.2 2 7 "Only a para-
mount public interest would warrant [any] abridgment of the inherent
right of testamentary disposition. '2 28 As discussed below, none of the
public policy arguments advanced for not enforcing these provisions rise
to the level necessary to overcome the priority the law places on testa-
mentary intention and, therefore, in terrorem provisions should be en-
forced because they represent the clearly expressed intention of testators
and settlors.229
2. Prevents Vexatious Litigation
The Texas legislature should favor in terrorem clauses because they de-
ter unwarranted litigation. In recent years, court dockets have been
overburdened due to the dramatic increase in litigation.2 30 Public policy
has always favored the reduction of litigation as evidenced by the 1869
declaration by the Supreme Court of Ohio that "nothing can be more in
conformity to good policy than to prevent litigation."'2 3 1 Forty years later,
the Supreme Court of California reiterated this policy in the context of an
in terrorem provision.
225. Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278.
226. In re Robinson's Estate, 68 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); see also
Begleiter, supra note 14, at 633 (citing In re Gustafson, 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1153-54 (N.Y.
1989)); Dainton, 658 P.2d at 81; 4 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON
THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.1, at 2 (rev. ed. 1961); Michael Hancher, Dead Letters; Wills and
Poems, 60 TEX. L. REV. 507, 514 (1982).
227. See Alper, 65 A.2d at 740-41; Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278; Begleiter, supra note 14, at
634.
228. Alper, 65 A.2d at 741.
229. See, e.g., Meech, 169 U.S. at 415; Burtman v. Burtman, 85 A.2d 892, 895 (N.H.
1952); Alper, 65 A.2d at 741; Dainton, 658 P.2d at 81. See generally Begleiter, supra note
14, at 631.
230. See Begleiter, supra note 14, at 635 (citing 1991 IOWA ST. CR. ADMINISTRATOR
ANN. STAT. REP. 82; Don J. DeBenedictis, L.A. Log-On, 76 A.B.A. J. 50 (1990); Stephen
Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A. J. 52 (1993); Frank Santiago, New
Study Shows More Judges Are Needed in State, DES MOINES REGISTER, Mar. 31, 1993, at
3M; Frank Santiago, Iowa Courts Ailing, DES MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 15, 1993, at IM, 3M).
231. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. at 548 (1869).
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Preliminary, it is to be observed that [an in terrorem clause], not only
does no violence to public policy, but meets with the approval of that
policy. Public policy dictates that the courts of the land should be
open, upon even terms, to all suitors. But this does not mean that it
invites or encourages litigation. To the contrary, it deplores litiga-
tion. "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium," ["It concerns the state
that there be an end of lawsuits" 232 ] and the great statute of frauds
and perjuries, and the laws limiting the time of the commencement
of actions, with many other of its rules and doctrines, are all designed
to give repose and security by prevention of litigation.2 33
Research reveals that the vast majority of will contests based on allega-
tions of undue influence, lack of mental capacity, or defective execution
fail, and, consequently, are vexatious.2 34 These meritless contests often
"waste away vast estates, by protracted and extravagant litigation. '2 35
Both the delay and reduction in the estate caused by litigation may have a
devastating effect on the beneficiaries of the will or trust. Thus, in ter-
rorem provisions should be legislatively sanctioned because they are "val-
uable will [and trust] devices [that] serve to protect estates from costly
and time-consuming litigation. 236
3. Reduces Family Animosity
Testators and settlors have legitimate reasons for wanting to avoid con-
tests and their concomitant results. "A will contest not infrequently en-
genders animosities and arouses hostilities among the kinsfolk of the
testator, which may never be put to rest and which contribute to [their]
general unhappiness .... Thus, a will contest may bring sorrow and suf-
fering to many concerned. '237 "Such contests often breed irreconcilable
family feuds, and lead to disgraceful family exposures. '238
Testators and settlors may prefer to leave their property to friends or
charities if they know their family might be torn apart as a result of a
232. Leavitt, supra note 2, at 60 (translating Latin phrase "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium," to mean "It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits").
233. Hite, 101 P. at 444.
234. See, e.g., Barry v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1943)
Studies which have been made show that only a very small percentage of will
contests made on the grounds of defective execution, mental incapacity or
undue influence are successful; and the public interest in freeing such con-
tests from the restraining influence of conditions like that here involved
seems of little importance compared with enforcing the will of the testator
that those who share in his bounty shall not have been guilty of besmirching
his reputation or parading the family skeletons after his death.
Id.; Bender v. Bateman, 168 N.E. 574, 575 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929) (stating "the great major-
ity of [will contest] cases will result only in the affirmance of the will"). See generally
Begleiter, supra note 14, at 635.
235. Donegan, 70 Ala. at 505. See also South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 963 (noting
that will contests "result in a waste of estates through expensive and long drawn out
litigation").
236. Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278. See also Alper, 65 A.2d at 740 (observing that "[t]he
restraint is defended as a device to lessen the wastage of the estate in litigation").
237. Rudd v. Searls, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928).
238. Donegan, 70 Ala. at 505.
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drawn out challenge to their will or trust. In terrorern provisions with
gifts over to these alternate beneficiaries provide a simple way for donors
to "minimize family bickering over the competence and capacity of testa-
tors, and the various amounts bequeathed. ' 239 Because in terrorem
clauses may promote the "peace and harmony of the living" 240 and re-
duce "the chance of increasing family animosities," 241 the Texas legisla-
ture should expressly approve in terrorem clauses to respect the donor's
wishes and preserve the family unit.
4. Protects Post-Death Privacy
The United States Supreme Court in 1898 recognized that will contests
often bring "to light matters of private life that ought never to be made
public, and in respect to which the voice of the testator can not be heard
either in explanation or denial; and, as a result, the manifest intention of
the testator is thwarted. '242 The 1928 Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts articulated this important policy for upholding in terrorem
clauses as follows:
Contests over the allowance of wills frequently, if not invariably, re-
sult in minute examination into the habits, manners, beliefs, conduct,
idiosyncrasies, and all the essentially private and personal affairs of
the testator, when he is not alive and cannot explain what may with-
out explanation be given a sinister appearance. To most persons
such exposure to publicity of their own personality is distasteful, if
not abhorrent. The ease with which plausible contentions as to
mental unsoundness may be supported by some evidence is also a
factor which well may be in the mind of a testator in determining to
insert such a clause in his will. Nothing in the law or in public policy,
as we understand it, requires the denial of solace of that nature to
one making a will. 243
In terrorem clauses are often inserted into dispositive instruments to
prevent heirs from "besmirching the reputation of the testator when he is
no longer alive to defend himself."'244 Although the property owner
could choose to leave the heir nothing or merely a nominal sum, such
action would not entice the dissatisfied heir to refrain from contesting the
will. However, if the heir is given a relatively large gift, but still consider-
ably less then the heir would receive under intestacy, the heir may make
the self-serving decision to forego the potentially unsuccessful contest
and be satisfied with the "sure thing." In a sense, the conditional gift
represents compensation given by the testator in consideration for the
heir refraining from "besmirching his reputation or parading the family
239. Seymour, 600 P.2d at 278 (discussing policy behind probable cause exception to
protect estates from costly litigation and lessen chance of family animosities over testator's
capacity and bequests).
240. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886.
241. Alper, 65 A.2d at 740.
242. Meech, 169 U.S. at 415.
243. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886.
244. Alper, 65 A.2d at 740.
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skeletons. '245 If the heir instead elects to forgo the conditional gift, and,
as a result of the litigation, the testator falls into disrepute and "the fam-
ily skeletons [are] made to dance,"2 46 then the in terrorem clause should
be given effect as the property owner intended. The law should not allow
the heirs who fail to carry their burden in setting aside a testamentary
instrument to take a conditional gift under that instrument unless the tes-
tator's conditions are met. The Texas legislature should validate in ter-
rorem clauses because they "may contribute to the fair reputation of the
dead. 247
5. Rights of Property Owners to Enjoy Property Not Affected
Proponents of the approach followed in states such as Indiana and
Florida, where in terrorem clauses are ineffective, often quote Chancellor
Wardlaw's dissenting opinion in the South Carolina case of Mallet v.
Smith where he argued that:
[i]t is the interest of the State that every legal owner should enjoy his
estate, and that no citizen should be obstructed by risk of forfeiture
from ascertaining his rights by the law of the land .... [I]t is against
the fundamental principles of justice and policy to inhibit a party
from ascertaining his rights by appeal to the tribunals established by
the State to settle and determine conflicting claims. If there be any
such thing as public policy, it must embrace the right of a citizen to
have his claims determined by law.248
Upon close analysis, in terrorem clauses are not actually in conflict with
this assertion. The principle that "every legal owner should enjoy his es-
tate" 249 is self-evident, at least to the extent that the rights of others are
not impinged. This principle, however, relates to the testator or settlor
who is the legal owner of the property to be transferred. Property owner-
ship is often analogized to the holding of a bundle of sticks, with each
stick representing a property right. The owner of the property holds all
the sticks in the bundle, including the right to transfer the property to
whomever the owner selects. The potential heirs of property owners do
not hold any of the sticks and may be completely disinherited.250 The
presumptive heirs only have a hope of receiving a gift in the future if the
property owner neglects to execute a valid will. Therefore, deeming in
terrorem provisions valid would not interfere with the right of owners to
enjoy their estates, but would instead further strengthen this right by al-
lowing property owners to place conditions on the testamentary gifts they
choose to make of their property.
245. Barry, 135 F.2d at 473.
246. Bender, 168 N.C. at 575.
247. Rudd, 160 N.E. at 886.
248. Mallet v. Smith, 28 S.C. Eq. 12, 20 (1853) (Wardlaw, C., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58(b)(1) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1997).
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6. In Terrorem Provisions Do Not Actually Cause Forfeiture
For many centuries, common law courts have repeatedly stated that the
law abhors a forfeiture. An in terrorem clause, however, does not place a
beneficiary at risk of forfeiture. Forfeiture occurs when a person loses
property to which that person had a legal right. An in terrorem clause
merely puts a condition on a gift; the beneficiary must comply with the
condition to obtain the property. Thus, violation of the in terrorem clause
does not cause a true forfeiture, but rather prevents the beneficiary from
obtaining an interest in the property in the first instance.
7. Contesting Beneficiary or Heir Has No Right to Ancestor's Property
Opponents of in terrorem provisions apparently deduce the property
right of an heir to the ancestor's estate from intestacy law.25' "The law
abhors intestacy"252 and, therefore, "presumes against it"253 and "favors
testacy over intestacy. '2 54 Only when property owners die without ex-
pressing their testamentary intent does the law favor intestate succession
over the alternative, which would be to allow the property to escheat to
the state. When a property owner dies with an instrument defining the
owner's testamentary intention, however, the heir's expectancy under in-
testacy law vanishes, leaving the heir with no rights in the property
owner's estate (except for the protections provided by statute for the sur-
viving spouse, children, and, in some jurisdictions, pretermitted children).
8. Heirs May Still Contest Instrument
The most powerful argument opposing the validity of in terrorem provi-
sions is that these clauses contradict the fundamental goal of the judicial
system "to discover the truth from differing assertions of facts, and out of
that truth to determine the rights and duties of the parties before it.' '25 5
An in terrorem provision, however, does not prevent an heir from chal-
lenging the property owner's will or trust. It only gives the heir the gran-
tor's message that "although I am not required to, I have chosen to make
a gift to you; if you do not respect what I have done and try to upset my
disposition in an attempt to receive a larger share of my property, then I
do not want you to have any of my property."
251. See Koren, supra note 60, at 191.
252. In re Estate of Ikuta, 639 P.2d 400, 406 (Haw. 1981) (quoting In re Weill's Trust
Estate, 406 P.2d 718, 724 (1965)); see also Montclair Trust Co. v. Lupher, 130 A.2d 858
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957); Spell v. Traxler, 93 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1956); Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co. v. Thomas, 54 A.2d 432, 440 (R.I. 1947).
253. Weill, 406 P.2d at 724; see also Tobler v. Moncrief, 178 A.2d 105, 108 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1962); Hackensack Trust Co. v. Bogert, 93 A.2d 402, 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1952).
254. In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456, 458 (W. Va. 1982); see also In re Oliverio's
Will, 415 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (N.Y. Sur. 1979); In re Estate of Edwards, 97 P. 23, 23 (Cal.
1908).
255. Koren, supra note 60, at 192.
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Heirs always have the right to contest.256 If they elect to exercise this
option, they are only required to prove their allegation by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, the lowest of the standard burdens of proof. There-
fore, an in terrorem clause does not inhibit anyone's access to the judicial
system. Rather, it simply adds one more uncertainty to the litigation.
Contestants in any litigation must consider a number of risks in deciding
whether to bring a lawsuit, including time commitments, legal fees, court
costs, emotional stress, and the exposure to counterclaims that may not
otherwise have been brought. An in terrorem clause gives the contestant
another reason to investigate and refrain from bringing a suit based on
weak or unfounded assertions. As the Supreme Court of Missouri wrote
in Rossi v. Davis, the contestant
may, without legal restraint, submit to the court the question, is the
purported instrument in fact the will of the maker? If it be adjudged
that it is not, he wins. If it be adjudged that it is, he loses. But every
litigant takes and must take the chance to win or lose in a lawsuit.257
9. Duty of Court to Probate Valid Wills Not Compromised
Proponents of in terrorem provisions argue that these clauses violate
public policy as they impede the flow of information necessary for the
court to make a proper determination of the validity of wills. These
clauses have a chilling effect on meritorious contests, especially in juris-
dictions that have not adopted a good faith, probable cause exception.
Without full information, the court may not discover the truth and conse-
quently probate an invalid will.258 This argument is based on the premise
that public policy requires that the courts admit to probate only those
instruments that meet the applicable statutory requirements and that are
made by testators who possessed the requisite capacity and were not un-
duly influenced. 259
This premise, however, is not completely supported by the real world
behavior of probate courts. Courts typically refuse to probate a will only
when someone raises an objection. Likewise, courts rarely take the initia-
tive to investigate the validity of a will. Further, the heirs and benefi-
ciaries have no duty, either by judicial creation or statute, to challenge
256. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10 (Vernon 1980) ("Any person interested in an
estate may, at any time before any issue in any proceeding is decided upon by the court,
file opposition thereto in writing and shall be entitled to process for witnesses and evi-
dence, and to be heard upon such opposition, as in other suits"); TEX. PROP. CODE
§ 115.011(a) (Vernon 1995) ("Any interested person may bring an action under Section
115.001 of this Act."); id. § 115.001(a) (addressing "all proceedings concerning trusts.").
257. Rossi, 133 S.W.2d at 372. See also Moran v. Moran, 123 N.W. 202, 206 (Iowa 1909)(stating "[t]he question he has to decide is the ordinary one which arises in nearly every
business transaction-whether the thing offered him is worth the price demanded"). See
also Begleiter, supra note 14, at 679 n.108 (comparing choice beneficiary is faced with to
settlement offers in typical law suit and pointing out that all conditional bequests require
beneficiary to give up a legal right, i.e., trust income conditioned on beneficiary refraining
from remarriage or smoking).




the validity of a will,260 even if they know the will failed to meet the
formal requirements, was the product of undue influence or coercion, or
was made while the testator lacked capacity. Therefore, the courts are
required to carefully consider the validity of an alleged will "if and only if
the matter is raised by one of the parties."'261 There is, in reality, no duty
on the courts to admit to probate only those wills that meet all the ele-
ments of validity. 262
10. Surviving Spouses and Minor Children Adequately Protected
Opponents of the enforceability of in terrorem provisions argue that
the surviving spouse and minor children cannot afford the risk of losing
testamentary gifts and, thus, will hesitate to contest the deceased spouse's
will, even if a good ground to do so exists.2 63 Texas law, however, has
already established adequate protections for surviving spouses and minor
children. To start with, the surviving spouse already owns one-half of the
community property, and, thus, the deceased spouse's will and its no-con-
test clause can only affect the deceased's separate property and share of
community. The Texas Probate Code's family allowance provisions re-
quire the court to order the deceased spouse's estate to support a needy
surviving spouse and minor children for one year. 264 The Texas
pretermitted child statute protects certain children of the decedent who
were born or adopted after will execution, even if they are adults and
suffer no financial hardship.2 65 The Texas legislature has also expressly
authorized testators to disinherit their heirs.2 66 Additional protection
through the non-recognition of in terrorem clauses is not necessary.2 67
11. Broad Probable Cause Exception Negates Effectiveness of In
Terrorem Provisions
Texas courts have never directly defined probable cause. Many courts
that recognize the exception have articulated a definition. For example,
probable cause to contest a will is found to exist when the contestant
"reasonably believes in the existence of facts upon which his claim is
based and reasonably believes that under such facts the claim may be
valid at common law or under an existing statute, or so believes in reli-
ance upon the advice of counsel. '268 Under definitions such as this, a
court could always find that the contestant had probable cause and set
aside the in terrorem clause, merely because the contestant relies on an
260. See, e.g., Bradford, 19 Ohio St. at 547-48; Elder, 120 A.2d at 819; Cooke, 153 Eng.
Rep. at 1047. See generally Begleiter, supra note 14, at 642.
261. Begleiter, supra note 14, at 642.
262. See id.
263. See Barry, 135 F.2d at 473 (Miller, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
264. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 286-293 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1997).
265. See id. § 67.
266. See id. § 58 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
267. See generally Begleiter, supra note 14, at 648.
268. Geisinger v. Geisinger, 41 N.W.2d 86, 93 (Iowa 1950).
[Vol. 51
IN TERROREM CLAUSES
attorney's representation that there is a reasonable chance that the con-
test could succeed. Thus, the Texas legislature should not adopt an un-
restricted good faith, probable cause exception but rather a narrow
exception only for contests based on grounds such as forgery2 69 and revo-
cation.270 Total rejection of the good faith, probable cause exception is
not warranted because it would permit nefarious individuals to "unscru-
pulously play upon the feelings of the testator... with impunity, [and to]
enjoy the fruits of their iniquity, and laugh in scorn at those whom they
have wronged."'27 '
B. RECOMMENDED STATUTE
PROBATE CODE SECTION 59B -
IN TERROREM CLAUSES2 72
(a) Definitions273
As used in this section:
(1) "Beneficiary" means a person to receive benefits under an
instrument.
(2) "Contest" means an attack in a proceeding on an instrument
which, if successful, would result in the instrument or any provision
thereof being declared invalid.2 74
(3) "Good faith" means that a beneficiary honestly believes that the
instrument or a provision thereof is invalid.
(4) "Instrument" includes a valid will and a valid trust.
(5) "In terrorem clause" means a provision in an otherwise valid in-
strument that penalizes the beneficiary who brings the contest by elimi-
nating or reducing the gift to that beneficiary.
269. The public has an interest in discovering crimes. See Alper, 65 A.2d at 740;
Begleiter, supra note 14, at 650 (citing 28 HALSBURY, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 585 (1914)).
270. A revoked instrument would no longer reflect the transferor's intent and, thus, the
beneficiary should be able to contest the instrument in good faith and upon probable
cause.
271. Friend, 58 A. at 854.
272. Because the proposed provision applies to both wills and trusts, the Texas Trust
Code should be amended to contain either (a) a reference to this section, or (b) a parallel
provision. The first option is preferred to prevent the application of different rules to wills
and trusts should the legislature amend one of the provisions without making a conforming
amendment to the other.
273. This section is based on § 21300 of the California Probate Code, which states:
§ 21300. Definitions
As used in this part:
(a) "Contest" means an attack in a proceeding on an instrument or on a
provision in an instrument.
(b) "No contest clause" means a provision in an otherwise valid instrument
that, if enforced, would penalize a beneficiary if the beneficiary brings a
contest.
274. The definition of "contest" excludes actions to construe or interpret the will. "If
the action ... is merely one to determine the true construction of the will, or of any of its
parts, the action could not be held to breach the ordinary forfeiture clause, for the object of
the action is not to make void the will, or any of its parts, but to ascertain its true legal
meaning." South Norwalk Trust Co., 101 A. at 963.
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(6) "Probable cause" means that the beneficiary reasonably believes in
the existence of facts and law which would permit that beneficiary to suc-
cessfully contest the instrument.
(7) "Transferor" includes the testator/testatrix of a valid will and the
settlor of a valid trust.
(b) In Terrorem Instrument275
(1) A transferor may provide in the terms of the instrument that the
gift of a beneficiary is subject to an express in terrorem clause contained
in the instrument and may draft the in terrorem clause to be applicable to
any or all of the beneficiaries under the instrument. The express in ter-
rorem provision may provide an alternate beneficiary in the event the
beneficiary violates the in terrorem provision. Absent any express terms,
the forfeited gift will pass under the terms of the instrument as if the
beneficiary predeceased the transferor without surviving descendants. 276
(2) A declaration in an instrument that it is an "in terrorem instru-
ment" is sufficient to prevent the vesting of all interests in any beneficiary
who initiates, joins, or voluntarily testifies in a contest of the instrument.
Any interest which does not vest due to this provision will pass under the
terms of the instrument as if the beneficiary predeceased the transferor
without surviving descendants.
(3) An instrument containing the terms authorized under subsection
(1) or (2) of this section may be referred to as an "in terrorem
instrument."
(4) A transferor may not prevent the application of the exceptions
contained in subsections (e) or (f) of this section.
(c) Construction of In Terrorem Clauses 277
Courts shall construe in terrorem clauses strictly in determining the in-
tent of the transferor.
(d) Enforcement of In Terrorem Clause278
Except to the extent otherwise provided in subsections (e) and (f) of
this section, an in terrorem clause is enforceable against a beneficiary who
275. This section is based on § 112.035 of the Texas Property Code, which describes the
creation of spendthrift trusts. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.035 (Vernon 1995).
276. The beneficiary is treated as predeceasing the transferor without "surviving de-
scendants" to prevent the application of a substituted gift for the transferor's children,
either under the instrument or via an application of the anti-lapse statute. TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1997). Without this language, a child could contest
a parent's will knowing that the only penalty associated with failure would be for the prop-
erty to pass to the child's descendants.
277. The section is based on § 21304 of the California Probate Code ("In determining
the intent of the transferor, a no contest clause shall be strictly construed.").
278. This section is based on § 21303 of the California Probate Code ("Except to the
extent otherwise provided in this part, a no contest clause is enforceable against a benefici-
ary who brings a contest within the terms of the no contest clause.") and § 3-3.5 of the New
York Estate, Powers, & Trusts Law, which reads as follows:
§ 3-3.5 Conditions qualifying dispositions; conditions against contest; limita-
tions thereon
(a) A condition qualifying a disposition of property is operative despite
the failure of the testator to provide for an alternative gift to take effect upon
the breach or non-occurrence of such condition.
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brings a contest within the prohibitions of the in terrorem clause, regard-
less of whether (a) the beneficiary brought the contest in good faith, (b)
the beneficiary had probable cause for bringing the contest, or (c) the
transferor provided an alternate beneficiary in the event the beneficiary
violated the in terrorem provision.
(e) Exceptions to Enforceability279
(1) An in terrorem clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to
the extent the beneficiary brings a contest in good faith and with prob-
able cause that is limited to one or more of the following grounds:
(b) A condition, designed to prevent a disposition from taking effect in
case the will is contested by the beneficiary, is operative despite the presence
or absence of probable cause for such contest, subject to the following:
(1) Such a condition is not breached by a contest to establish that the
will is a forgery or that it was revoked by a later will, provided that such
contest is based on probable cause.
(2) An infant or incompetent may affirmatively oppose the probate
of a will without forfeiting any benefit thereunder.
(3) The following conduct, singly or in the aggregate, shall not result
in the forfeiture of any benefit under the will:
(A) The assertion of an objection to the jurisdiction of the court
in which the will was offered for probate.
(B) The disclosure to any of the parties or to the court of any
information relating to any document offered for probate as a last will, or
relevant to the probate proceeding.
(C) A refusal or failure to join in a petition for the probate of a
document as a last will, or to execute a consent to, or waiver of notice of a
probate proceeding.
(D) The preliminary examination, under SCPA 1404, of a propo-
nent's witnesses, the person who prepared the will, the nominated executors
and the proponents in a probate proceeding.
(E) The institution of, or the joining or acquiescence in a pro-
ceeding for the construction of a will or any provision thereof.
N.Y. EST., POWERS, & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.5 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1997).
279. This section is based on § 21306 of the California Probate Code, which reads as
follows:
§ 21306. Exceptions to enforceability
A no contest clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to the extent
the beneficiary, with probable cause, brings a contest that is limited to one or
more of the following grounds:
(a) Forgery.
(b) Revocation.
(c) An action to establish the invalidity of any transfer described in Sec-
tion 21350.
(d) A petition to remove a trustee under paragraph (6) of subdivision (b)
of Section 15642.
Section 21350 referred to in section 21306(c) above states in full:
§ 21350. Prohibited transferees; definitions
(a) Except as provided in Section 21351, no provision, or provisions, of
any instrument shall be valid to make any donative transfer to any of the
following:
(1) The person who drafted the instrument.
(2) A person who is related by blood or marriage to, is a cohabitant
with, or is an employee of, the person who drafted the instrument.
(3) Any partner or shareholder of any law partnership or law corpo-
ration in which the person described in paragraph (1) has an ownership inter-





(iii) An action to establish the invalidity of any transfer described
in Section 61282 or Section 69283 of this Code, 284 or
(iv) A petition to remove an executor or trustee.
(2) An in terrorem clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to
the extent the beneficiary contests a provision in good faith and with
probable cause that benefits any of the following persons:
(i) A person who drafted or transcribed the instrument, or
(ii) A person who gave directions to the drafter of the instrument
concerning dispositive or other substantive contents of the provi-
sion or who directed the drafter to include the in terrorem clause
in the instrument.2 85
(3) An in terrorem clause is not enforceable against any beneficiary
named in the instrument who does not voluntarily testify or join in the
(4) Any person who has a fiduciary relationship with the transferor,
including, but not limited to, a conservator or trustee, who transcribes the
instrument or causes it to be transcribed.
(5) A person who is related by blood or marriage to, is a cohabitant
with, or is an employee of a person who is described in paragraph (4).
(b) For purposes of this section, "a person who is related by blood or
marriage" to a person means all of the following:
(1) The person's spouse or predeceased spouse.
(2) Relatives within the third degree of the person and of the per-
son's spouse.
(3) The spouse of any person described in paragraph (2).
In determining any relationship under this subdivision, Sections 6406,
6407, and Chapter 2 (commencing with section 6450) of Part 2 of Division 6
shall be applicable.
280. Where the contestant has probable cause of the commission of a crime, such as
forgery, the law should not penalize the contestant. If the instrument was forged, then it
does not represent the transferor's true intent. See Rouse v. Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 135 (S.C.
1912).
If a devisee should accept the fruits of the crime of forgery under the belief,
and upon probable cause, that it was a forgery, he would thereby become
morally a particeps criminis, and yet, if he is unwilling to commit this moral
crime, be confronted with the alternative of doing so, or of taking the risk of
losing all under the will, in case it should be found not to be a forgery.
Id.; see also Alper, 65 A.2d at 740.
281. A beneficiary should not risk forfeiture if the beneficiary is in good faith and has
probable cause to believe that the instrument offered for probate was revoked. If the
transferor revoked the instrument, it no longer represents the transferor's intentions with
regard to property disposition.
282. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 61 (Vernon 1980) (voiding gifts to beneficiaries who
are also subscribing witnesses).
283. See id. § 69 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1997) (voiding gifts to the testator's ex-spouse).
284. The Texas legislature has already deemed these types of gifts suspect and this ex-
ception carries forward its decision with regard to in terrorem clauses.
285. A good faith, probable cause exception is warranted for beneficiaries challenging
gifts to individuals closely connected with the preparation of the instrument because these
persons may have been so involved in the decision to include the in terrorem clause that
they should not be allowed to utilize the provision to shelter their gifts from inquiry. See
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58b (Vernon Supp. 1998).
This section is based on § 21307 of the California Probate Code, which provides:
§ 21307. Provision benefiting witness or person involved in drafting or tran-
scribing instrument; contest; enforcement of clause
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contest of the instrument when the contest is brought by any other per-
son, regardless of whether the contestant is named or not named in the
instrument. 286
(f) Declaratory Judgment2 87
(1) If an instrument containing an in terrorem clause is or has become
irrevocable, a beneficiary may apply to the court for a determination of
whether a particular motion, petition, or other act by the beneficiary
would be a contest within the terms of the in terrorern clause following
the procedures provided by Chapter 37, Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.
(2) If the court finds that the beneficiary's motion, petition, or other
act would be a contest within the terms of the in terrorem provision, all
costs of the action and the reasonable attorney fees of any person claim-
ing that the beneficiary's motion, petition, or other act would be a con-
test, are chargeable against the beneficiary who sought the declaratory
judgment.
A no contest clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to the extent
the beneficiary, with probable cause, contests a provision that benefits any of
the following persons:
(a) A person who drafted or transcribed the instrument.
(b) A person who gave directions to the drafter of the instrument con-
cerning dispositive or other substantive contents of the provision or who di-
rected the drafter to include the no contest clause in the instrument, but this
subdivision does not apply if the transferor affirmatively instructed the
drafter to include the contents of the provision or the no contest clause.
(c) A person who acted as a witness to the instrument.
286. This clause would prevent an heir who is not named in the instrument or who is
dissatisfied with the gift in the instrument from blackmailing other beneficiaries of the
instrument with the threat of litigation and risk of forfeiture, where the in terrorem clause
is worded broadly, e.g., "Any bequest made in this will is forfeited if this will is challenged
by any heir." Likewise, this provision prevents forfeiture merely because a contestant sub-
poenas a beneficiary to testify.
287. This section gives a beneficiary the opportunity to determine the nature of the
proposed action so that the beneficiary may make an informed decision whether to con-
tinue with full notice of the risk involved. To prevent the overuse of this provision, benefi-
ciaries who fail to demonstrate that their conduct is not a contest are responsible for all
costs associated with the action, even the reasonable attorneys fees of individuals asserting
that the conduct is actually a contest.
This section is based on § 21320 of the California Probate Code, which provides:
§ 21320. Irrevocable instruments; enforcement of clause
(a) If an instrument containing a no contest clause is or has become irrev-
ocable, a beneficiary may apply to the court for a determination whether a
particular motion, petition, or other act by the beneficiary, including, but not
limited to, creditor claims under Part 4 (commencing with Section 9000) of
Division 7 and Part 8 (commencing with Section 19000) of Division 9, would
be a contest within the terms of the no contest clause.
(b) A no contest clause is not enforceable against a beneficiary to the
extent an application under subdivision (a) by the beneficiary is limited to
the procedure and purpose described in subdivision (a) and does not require
a determination of the merits of the motion, petition, or other act by the
beneficiary.
(c) A determination of whether Section 21306 or 21307 would apply in a
particular case may not be made under this section.
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(3) A request for a declaratory judgment does not violate an in ter-
rorem provision regardless of the terms of the provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
In terrorem provisions have a long and rich history. The clauses were
approved by early common law courts and continue to be deemed valid
in the majority of states. Although Texas originally treated the in ter-
rorem clause as valid without exception, the lower courts have gradually
clouded the doctrine with numerous different constructions. The lack of
a definitive Supreme Court of Texas decision, coupled with the lower
courts' varying opinions, renders the enforceability of in terrorem provi-
sions in Texas uncertain. To provide a reliable method for testators and
settlors to protect their dispositive plans from the attacks of disgruntled
beneficiaries, the Texas legislature should clarify this murky area by en-
acting a comprehensive in terrorem statute. A statute, such as the one
proposed above, would allow testators and settlors to create estate plans
with enforceable in terrorem provisions designed to prevent dissatisfied
individuals from overturning granting instruments and taking more than
was intended via intestacy or a prior instrument.
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